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ABSTRACT 
Gusta, Michael L., M.Sc. University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, April 2010. Seed 
Ownership and Distribution of Rents in an IPPM System: Cases in Canadian Wheat 
Supervisor: R. S. Gray 
The focus of this thesis is to explore the influence of market power possessed by 
seed input companies on rent distribution in an identity preserved production and 
marketing system. This thesis develops a theoretical model to estimate rent distribution 
between participants in an identity preserved production and marketing system under 
constrained production and the elicitation of a premium from market development 
activities in the presence of a range of seed ownership structures. The thesis employs an 
empirical model to examine rent distribution of two varieties involved in the Canadian 
Wheat Board‟s Identity Preserved Contract Program.  
The theoretical model demonstrates that market development activities for an 
identity preserved production and marketing program had a diminished impact on 
farmers when the seed industry possessed a large degree of market power. The finding of 
the theoretical model were consistent with that of the empirical model, where the price of 
certified seed for varieties involved in the identity preserved production and marketing 
program were priced higher than conventional varieties. The difference in price was 
found to be greater than the premiums offered by the Identity Preserved Contract 
Program marketing and/or production contracts for Saskatchewan farmers that received 
average yields and average prices of grain. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction 
Consumer preference for grain has been changing, moving away from what is offered by 
traditional commodity markets thereby creating an opportunity for the development of niche 
markets. Niche markets are specialty markets that offer a unique product that can be priced at a 
premium over general commodity markets. This allows farmers an opportunity to sell their 
product at a premium price. However, niche market products require efficient organization and 
management of production, transportation, and marketing (Canadian Grain Commission 1998). 
The delivery of niche market products through conventional supply chains are faced with 
difficulties because the supply chain is comprised of a number of participants that operate 
independently and in their own best interest. As a result, the firms in the supply chain require a 
framework for coordination as well as guidelines to maintain purity, incentives for participation, 
and a system for assigning liability in the case of a failure. Such a framework can come through 
an arrangement between firms within the supply chain known as an identity preserved production 
and marketing (IPPM) system. 
Identity preserved production and marketing systems coordinate supply chain activities 
for the production, transportation, and marketing of a niche market product to consumers.
1
 The 
system involves the participation of multiple firms including, but not limited to; breeders, seed 
companies, farmers, grain handlers, processors, marketers, and consumers. A series of contracts 
organize participants in an IPPM system. These contracts, which establish the relationship 
between participants, are a critical tool for the coordination of activities and provide incentives 
                                                 
1
 Consumers of an IPPM product in the context of this thesis are processors, wholesalers, retailers, or end-use 
consumers. 
 2 
for participation (Smyth and Phillips 2001). The contracts allow the IPPM system to align 
product characteristics with consumer preferences in order to elicit a premium (Reichert and 
Vachal 2003). In addition, the contracts distribute the premium to participants in the supply chain 
in the form of economic rents. Identity preserved production and marketing system can 
theoretically increase returns to participants through a combination of higher margins as well as a 
guarantee of receipts. 
1.1 Market Power and Identity Preserved Production and Marketing Systems 
The premium commanded by IPPM systems is distributed throughout the supply chain to 
create incentives for participation in the program. However, the presence of the premium also 
creates an incentive for the exertion of market power by opportunistic firms. The exertion of 
market power results in the redistribution of rents within the system, possibly allowing a firm to 
capture the majority of the premium generated by the system. If incentives are insufficient at any 
stage in the IPPM system participation may not occur causing the system to fail (Smyth and 
Phillips 2002).  
Market power, possessed by upstream and downstream participants, arises from the 
control of an input or service that cannot be easily substituted (National Farmers Union 2000; 
Harl 2000). Within IPPM systems market power typically results from a critical agricultural 
input, such as a unique seed variety, protected by intellectual property rights (IPR). In general, a 
small number of large firms dominate agricultural input markets. These firms can be assumed to 
possess sufficient information about the rents generated from their input, and price the input in 
such a way as to capture the greatest possible share of rents (Harl 2004). The ability of a firm to 
exert market power is dependent upon the contractual arrangements between the participants as 
well as the policies and requirements of the IPPM system.  
 3 
1.2 Canadian Wheat Board Identity Preserved Contract Program 
The Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) is the single desk seller for Western Canadian wheat 
and barley for human consumption in export and domestic markets.
2
 It has established a 
reputation that Western Canadian wheat is “the best in the world”. As such, the CWB has 
developed a premium brand for Western Canadian wheat, in which it is the single seller. As a 
single desk seller, with established marketing channels, and wheat and barley brand make it a 
good candidate for the development of IPPM systems (Smyth and Phillips 2001). Additionally, 
the development of new IPPM systems by a credible and trusted institution, such as the CWB, 
increases the probability of the IPPM systems‟ success (Smyth and Phillips 2001). 
The CWB has taken advantage of its expertise and responded to increasing consumer 
demand for specialty grains with the creation of an IPPM system called the Identity Preserved 
Contract Program (IPCP). The IPCP began operation in 1998
3
 and has grown and developed to 
deal with issues arising from the coordination of activities of firms in the Canadian wheat supply 
chain. The IPCP is composed of two marketing programs, a commercial IPCP that focuses on 
market penetration, and a developmental IPCP that focuses on market development. Market 
penetration occurs in established specialty wheat markets where the CWB‟s objective is to serve 
the market and increase market share. Market development involves the creation of markets for 
new varieties that contain unique characteristics, which meets consumer preferences. The 
combination of these two marketing programs allows the CWB to highlight Canadian wheat and 
barley production as well as Canadian breeding efforts. However, even though the CWB has a 
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 Within Canada feed wheat and feed barley can be sold outside the CWB. In the remainder of this thesis reference to 
the wheat and barley supply chain pertains to wheat and barley marketed by the CWB. 
3
 The IPCP was initially called the Market Development Contract Program. Its name was later changed to better 
reflect the goals of the program. 
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monopoly of Western Canadian wheat and barley and is the developer of the IPCP the CWB is 
not the sole possessor of market power within the IPCP. 
The CWB and seed companies both possess market power in the IPCP. Seed company‟s 
market power comes from its ownership of certain varieties that are protected by IPR as well as 
from the contract structure of the IPCP. The IPR grant the seed company a monopoly over the 
marketing and price of the seed. The contract structure requires farmers to have a production 
contract with seed companies in order to participate in the IPCP and to obtain their varieties of 
seed (CWB 2005b). Control over the production contract grants the seed company control over 
the distribution of the contracts, as well as control over the contract‟s policies. Two policies of 
note for these production contracts are; the requirement for the use of certified seed, and the sale 
of all grain produced back to the seed company. These policies prevent farmers from saving or 
obtaining saved seed. The combination of IPR and production contract policies grant seed 
companies a large degree of market power over the IPCP, providing them with a small and easily 
identifiable market for the exertion of its market power.  
The CWB is in a position to reduce the exertion of the seed industries market power. The 
CWB‟s market power comes from its single desk selling authority and from the development of 
the IPCP program. This combined with the CWB‟s mandate to return all revenues to farmers less 
the cost of marketing and administration, allows the CWB to exert market power over the IPCP 
on behalf of farmers to maximize farmer‟s profits. As a result, the seed industry, farmers or both 
can capture the rents generated in the IPCP.  
1.3 Thesis Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to model and examine the distribution of rents within the 
IPCP where input suppliers possess significant market power. The hypothesis of this thesis is that 
 5 
seed companies exert market power within the IPCP and extract the majority of the rents. The 
theoretical model examines the incentives for participants, and the empirical analysis tests the 
hypothesis. 
The theoretical model is developed to examine the IPCP policies under a vertical market, 
consisting of a market for identity preserved (IP
4
) seed and a market for IP grain. The theoretical 
model presents two IPCP policies; constrained production, and market development activities.
5
 
The impact of the two policies will be examined separately and jointly creating four scenarios; 
base case, constrained supply, market development activities, and a constrained supply with 
market development activities. In these four scenarios the seed industry will be presented under 
three seed ownership structures; monopolistic, perfectly competitive, and oligopolistic. Rent 
distribution and Marshallian surpluses will be measured under each seed ownership structure and 
compared between scenarios. The scenarios developed in the theoretical model are representative 
of the empirical analysis cases. 
The empirical analysis compares the relative profitability of two commercial IPCP 
varieties with non-IPCP varieties. The first case, Canadian Western Amber Durum (CWAD), 
compares the IPCP variety AC Navigator with two non-IPCP varieties AC Avonlea and Kyle. 
The varieties AC Navigator and AC Avonlea are similar with respect to production 
characteristics and seed ownership structure, with both owned by the same seed company. The 
difference between the two varieties is that the production of AC Avonlea is unconstrained, while 
AC Navigator is restricted to contracted production. The comparison of AC Navigator and Kyle 
is associated with differences in seed ownership structures, AC Navigator owned by a monopolist 
                                                 
4
 IP within the context of this paper will only refer to identity preservation. 
5
 Market development activities should not be confused with the market development IPCP. Market development 
activities increase the value of a product to its market in order to generate a premium. 
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and Kyle owned by a competitive oligopoly. The second case, Canadian Western Hard White 
Spring wheat (CWHWS), compares the IPCP variety Snowbird with a standardized non-IPCP 
Canadian Western Red Spring wheat (CWRS) variety.
6
 This case examines the influence of yield 
and market fluctuations over time on the profitability of involvement in the IPCP. Each case 
measures the relative profitability (i.e. revenue less costs that are not common between the two 
varieties) of the IPCP variety for a representative Saskatchewan farmer
7
 in order to provide an 
estimation of farmer benefit from participation.  
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters, each providing a logical next step to explain; the 
system, the alignment between the seed companies, farmers and marketer, and how the rents are 
distributed. The first chapter identifies and describes the problem, introduces key concepts and 
outlines the testing of the hypothesis. Chapter two provides an explanation of IPPM systems and 
the suitability of IPPM systems in Canada. The third chapter constructs the theoretical model 
employed by the study, outlines the structure of the vertical market, and analyzes the impact of 
IPPM policies and seed industry‟s market power on farmer welfare. The fourth chapter further 
examines the CWB‟s IPCP, and formulates the empirical analysis for two cases of IPCP varieties 
and tests the hypothesis developed in chapter one. The fifth chapter discusses the results of the 
theoretical model and the empirical analysis, summarising the conclusions drawn from the thesis, 
the limitations of the study, and presents suggestions for further research. 
                                                 
6
 The standardized CWRS variety has production characteristics calculated from a weighted average (in terms of 
proportion of production) of all of the CWRS varieties produced in the year in question. 
7
 In the context of this thesis a representative Saskatchewan farmer is a farmer in Saskatchewan that receives average 
yield at an expected quality for the variety of grain. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2 Literature Review 
The Canadian Wheat Board‟s (CWB) Identity Preserved Contract Program (IPCP), is 
aimed to align the activities of firms within the supply chain in order to develop an identity 
preserved production and marketing (IPPM) system for Western Canadian wheat, durum and 
barley. The IPCP is relatively large, the 2008-09 crop year accounted for nearly 620 thousand 
acres of wheat production within the CWB jurisdiction, which was equal to 2.6% of all seeded 
acres for all types of wheat (Hilderman 2009).
8
 Over the past 10 years, the IPCP has grown and 
developed to deal with the specific issues arising from the production and handling of specialty 
grains through the Canadian wheat supply chain. Even though the IPCP has succeeded in meeting 
its objective for establishing an IPPM system, market power and rent distribution issues remain. 
Before examining the IPCP, it is important to explain what an IPPM system is and how it 
influences, and influenced by, firms in the supply chain. This chapter begins by identifying IPPM 
system components, including the motivation for the development of an IPPM system, and the 
encouragement of participation. This is followed by an examination of the agricultural supply 
chain and its organization; outlining the different firms in the supply chain and their interaction 
with an IPPM system. The problems and issues that arise from operating an IPPM system are 
then discussed. The chapter ends by describing the future of IPPM systems in Western Canada, 
as well as highlighting key aspects of the literature review.  
                                                 
8
 Statistics Canada (2008) reported 23.5 million acres of all wheat seeded in the Prairie Provinces. 
 8 
2.1 Identity Preserved Production and Marketing (IPPM) Systems 
Identity preserved production and marketing systems provide a framework for the 
delivery of a specialty product from areas of production to areas of consumption. In order for the 
product to make it to consumers, the supply chain requires organization and to undertake special 
precautions in order to maintain the product‟s purity. This organization of firms in the supply 
chain is not spontaneously generated but is developed by a firm in the supply chain responding to 
an identified disparity between the current product and consumer preference. Consequently, in 
order to elicit a response, the developer of the IPPM system must see some capturable benefit for 
the creation and delivery of the product. However, in order to capture the benefit from the IPPM 
system the developer requires the participation of the other firms in the supply chain, and as such 
must distribute some of the capturable benefit to each firm along the supply chain in order to 
cover the costs of the system and provide incentives for participation. This section provides an 
overview of the components of IPPM systems, the drivers behind IPPM systems, and the tools 
required to elicit the participation of firms comprising the supply chain.  
2.1.1 Components of an IPPM System 
Identity preserved production and marketing systems seek to accomplish three major 
tasks; the maintenance of product purity, supply chain alignment, and to market the product. 
Product purity is maintained through segregation and identity preservation (IP) practices. Supply 
chain alignment involves the coordination of supply chain activities, as well as providing 
incentives for participation. Finally, the marketing activities promote the product for the 
generation of a premium sufficient for the system‟s operation. The successful combination of all 
these activities allows IPPM systems to operate. 
 9 
Segregation, IP and IPPM are three systems that can maintain product purity. Each 
system builds upon the last but differences in focus and goals cause each to stand apart. 
Segregation is the separation of like and unlike crops and varieties in order to maintain product 
purity and to prevent contamination or mixing (Smyth and Phillips 2002). Identity preservation 
includes segregation but also allows for the identification of source and nature of the product as it 
moves through the supply chain (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001). Identity preservation production 
and marketing involves segregation and IP with the added focus on the organization and 
coordination of firms in the supply chain to produce and market a specific product.  
Segregation, the activity of maintaining product purity, comes in two forms; spatial and 
temporal. Spatial segregation involves the use of a dedicated infrastructure for the storage and 
delivery of a defined pure product, while temporal segregation involves infrastructure shared by 
both the segregated and the conventional products. Each type of segregation poses costs to the 
system; spatial segregation requires an investment in dedicated infrastructure, while temporal 
segregation requires higher labour cost to prevent contamination (Menrad et al. 2009). 
Regardless of the type of segregation used, the costs can be significant. 
Identity preservation is an extension of segregation but with the purpose of maintaining 
the identity of a product to provide a guarantee of meeting certain standards (Harling 2001). 
Identity preservation primarily includes two activities in addition to segregation, the 
establishment of a paper trail, and sampling. These activities are conducted as the product moves 
through the supply chain, with each stage of the supply chain adding to the paper trail and 
obtaining their own sample. The paper trail gathers and maintains important information 
pertaining to production and possibly some quality characteristics; growing conditions, inputs, 
crop variety, yield, protein content, etc. (Kennet et al. 1998). The information provides value to 
 10 
the product by reducing sorting and transaction costs that are associated with specialty grains, by 
knowing the purity and quality of the product (Soucie 1997). Sampling serves three purposes; 
detecting failures within the system, enabling the assignment of liability if failure occurs, and to 
direct measures to prevent future failures (Opara 2003). The combination of maintaining product 
purity, supplying pertinent information, and sampling make up the major components of an IP 
system.  
An IPPM system integrates segregation and IP but with the added focus coordinating 
supply chain activities to produce a product that meets the needs of a specific market that is 
willing to pay a premium. This system builds upon that of an IP system but involves marketing 
activities in order to make the system viable. If the premium garnered by the IPPM system is 
insufficient to cover the costs of the system, it becomes imperative to reduce costs through 
further coordination of supply chain activities. The activities of firms in the supply chain are 
coordinated through a series of contractual agreements and alignments. The contracts not only 
reduce inefficiencies, but assists in the prevention of losses due to contamination, and the 
resultant loss in customer loyalty and product premium. The contracts also provide a means for 
managing the rent distribution between participants in an IPPM system, providing incentives for 
participation. The successful marketing of the niche market product generates the rents for the 
system and its participants.  
The marketing of a niche market product can come in two forms market penetration, and 
market development. Market penetration involves a firm increasing its market share in a pre-
existing market, by competing on price or product quality. Market development involves the 
establishment of a market for a new product by communicating the benefits of a new product 
with unique characteristics to potential customers (Soucie 1997). Each marketing strategy has its 
 11 
own associated risks; market penetration faces the risk of competition, while market development 
faces market acceptance and establishment risks. The risks associated with market development 
are larger but also present greater possible rents (Ansoff 1957). Both marketing forms require an 
understanding of the market in order to obtain a premium sufficient to make the IPPM system 
viable.  
2.1.2 Demand and Supply Influences of IPPM 
The motivation for developing an IPPM system stems from agricultural commodities 
being highly variable and inconsistent in quality. This results in a commodity that has a wide 
array of intrinsic characteristics ill suited to meet the changing preferences of consumers and 
processors (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001; Kennet et al. 1998). Consumer income and increased 
sophistication regarding food safety, high quality food, and dietary concerns, drive consumer 
preferences (Phillips and Smyth 2003; Reichert and Vachal 2003; Soucie 1997; Vachal and 
Reichert 2000). Consumer preferences can also be subjective and difficult to quantify, creating 
uncertainty for market response (Soucie 1997). In addition to consumers, processors are 
increasing their demand for high quality and uniform grain (Brester et al. 1996; Dahl et al. 2004; 
Kennet et al. 1998; Reichert and Vachal 2003). The opportunity to develop an IPPM system 
occurs when commodity markets do not meet consumer and/or processor preferences and where 
the communication of changes in preferences is not done in a prompt and cost-effective manner 
(Kennet et al. 1998; Martinez and Stewart 2003; Reichert and Vachal 2003). 
Communication up and down the supply chain allow for IPPM systems to operate; this is 
achieved through promoting a product down the supply chain to find a market, or communication 
of consumer preference up the supply chain in order to find or develop a product. As a result, 
downstream firms (consumers, marketers, and processors) and upstream firms (breeders, input 
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suppliers, and farmers) both can have the incentive to develop an IPPM system (Smyth and 
Phillips 2001). An example of an IPPM system is illustrated in Figure 2.1 with the IPPM product 
travelling down the supply chain (black lines), and information travelling up and down the supply 
chain (grey lines). The IPPM system provides a method of communication between multiple 
stages of a supply chain. The number of stages in an IPPM supply chain can vary, some ranging 
from farmers to processors, others integrated from breeding through retail (Smyth and Phillips 
2001). The development of the majority of IPPM systems are done further down the supply chain 
by firms able to meet or anticipate changing consumer preferences (Phillips and Smyth 2003). 
Recently, upstream firms have also become involved in the development of IPPM systems.  
Wheat breeding institutions are interested in the development of IPPM systems to 
maximize the potential benefit of new varieties that meet specific market preferences (Dahl et al. 
2004; Herring 2005). In the absence of an IPPM system, these varieties would have limited 
success if blended or pooled with the general commodity. This has encouraged breeding 
institutions to require an IPPM system in licensing agreements with seed companies in order to 
realize the potential of new varieties (Herring 2005; Peterson 2005). Regulators can also impose a 
limited release when there is symmetric risk, when a new variety poses a threat to the general 
commodity (Smyth and Phillips 2001). 
Farmers and farm cooperatives are now becoming more involved in the development of 
IPPM systems for the production of high value unique grains for specific markets (Reichert and 
Vachal 2003). In the United States, new generation cooperatives have emerged in the creation of 
IPPM systems through a pooling of resources and production capacity to meet market demands. 
Since the ability of farmers and farm cooperatives to market these varieties may be limited to 
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local market levels, they may require access to markets through elevators and private companies 
(Ransom et al. 2006). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Wheat Supply Chain 
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Regardless of the stage in the supply chain where the IPPM system begins, the primary 
goal of the system is to increase rents to the developer, which in turn must share a portion of the 
rents with the rest of the firms in the supply chain. The distribution of rents is of concern for 
IPPM systems to ensure that rents are sufficient to elicit the participation of firms in the supply 
chain. 
2.1.3 Revenue Generation and Management 
As previously stated, IPPM systems present an opportunity to increase revenue of 
participants, as well as reduce the risks and costs associated with specialty wheat markets. The 
management of risk and cost, as well as the distribution of revenue is an important activity of 
IPPM systems (Smyth and Phillips 2001; Wilson 2001). The structure of the IPPM system‟s 
contracts and vertical alignments provides a revenue management tool for firms in the supply 
chain, thus creating a framework for rent distribution between participants (Smyth and Phillips 
2001). This framework allows for an overseeing of the distribution of rents ensuring adequate 
rents to participants to cover the additional costs of involvement as well as the opportunity costs 
of alternatives (Kennet et al. 1998).  
Identity preserved production and marketing systems allow for a higher degree of control 
by upstream and downstream participants over the product than traditional commodity markets. 
The increased control over the product traveling through the supply chain creates opportunities 
for achieving greater profits than that of traditional commodity markets (Reichert and Vachal 
2003). Farmers are able to market their grain directly at set terms; consumers in turn have a 
higher level of control over the production, and resultant quality and consistency of the product 
(Kennet et al. 1998; Reichert and Vachal 2003). Opportunities exist within IPPM systems for 
both backwards and forwards integration; however, this can create new risks and uncertainties for 
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other participants in the IPPM system (Brester et al. 1996). Vertical integration provides firms 
with a greater share of market power as well as creates multiple profit points along the supply 
chain. The developer of the IPPM system, the bargaining power of the IPPM system‟s 
participants, and the orientation of the firms within the supply chain, can all affect the 
distribution of rents within an IPPM system.  
2.2 The Supply Chain for Canadian Wheat 
The agricultural supply chain for wheat in Canada consists of a number of stages that 
require coordination in order to meet the specific needs of an IPPM system. In the context of this 
study, the supply chain is composed of five stages; wheat breeders, seed companies, farmers, 
grain handlers, and marketer. The IPPM system provides a framework for the coordination and 
cooperation within the supply chain. Vertical integration can allow one firm to conduct activities 
at multiple stages, but vertical integration through the entire supply chain is unlikely thus creating 
requiring the need for an IPPM system (Preater 2006; Perry 1982). This section examines these 
firms, outlining their activities and alignments within an IPPM system. 
2.2.1 Wheat Breeders 
The supply chain begins with breeders that develop new wheat varieties. Wheat breeding 
programs in Western Canada are typically publicly funded, or funded through a voluntary levy 
paid by farmers to the Western Grains Research Foundation (Rowland 2006). Varieties are 
protected by intellectual property rights (IPR) which are licensed by public institutions to seed 
companies for a span of 10 years, granting monopoly marketing rights (Hucl 2006). Varieties 
developed by wheat breeding intuitions can take one of two forms, production traits (higher or 
more stable yield), or output traits (higher quality, or other characteristics desired by consumers). 
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Identity preserved production and marketing systems cater to varieties that contain 
specific output traits that affect the end products quality characteristics. Outside of IPPM 
systems, output trait varieties may offer little benefit if they are not as agronomically competitive 
as conventional varieties, having a lower yield or reduced disease resistance, resulting in lower 
adoption rates (Dahl et al. 2004). Quality improvements that are easily measured (protein and test 
weight) are more easily adopted than functional characteristics (absorption, stability, gluten 
strength, etc.). Functional characteristics are difficult and expensive to measure and may have no 
explicit market-determined premium (Dahl et al. 2004). Additionally, co-mingling or 
contamination with conventional varieties can result in diminishing or eliminating the quality 
improvement of an output trait developed in a new variety (Smyth and Phillips 2001).  
Prior to 2008, the development of output trait varieties was restricted by a set of rules 
called kernel visual distinguishability (KVD) that governed wheat variety licensing (AAFC 
2008). The variety registration rules required varietal classes to be visually distinct, allowing for 
the class of grain to be quick and easy determination at the time of sale, thereby decreasing 
transaction costs. The relaxation of these requirements in 2008 created additional opportunities 
for wheat breeders to develop new output trait varieties as well as to release previously developed 
high yielding, disease resistance, or higher end-user quality varieties that did not previously meet 
KVD standards. With the relaxation of KVD requirements, it is expected that the number of 
varieties suitable for niche markets to increase, which in turn will increase the demand for more 
IPPM systems within Canada. 
2.2.2 Seed Industry 
The seed industry supplies, and markets, seed that is certified as being a certain variety, 
an integral component of IPPM systems. The seed industry is an agricultural input supplier that 
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grows specific seed varieties demanded by farmers and their markets. The exclusive licensing of 
varieties from breeders grants seed companies monopoly rights over the marketing of seed 
varieties (Rowland 2006). The licensing and the associated IPR grants the seed company market 
power, allowing it to capture the benefits of the variety (Moschini and Lapan 1997). The seed 
industry consists of a small number of organizations that operate either as a corporation or as a 
seed grower group cooperative (Preater 2006). An exclusive license allows corporations to price 
seed as a monopoly, using seed growers under a contractual basis for seed production. In 
contrast, grower group cooperatives operate as an oligopoly, where member seed growers pool 
their resources for the licensing of varieties. Members of the grower group cooperative market 
the variety independently and compete with each other on price and geography (Preater 2006). 
2.2.3 Farmers 
Farmers are involved in IPPM systems through a series of contracts for the production 
and sale of IPPM wheat. Farmers produce IPPM wheat the same way they do for conventional 
wheat, but with the added requirements of segregation and IP. Farmers are large in number and 
heterogeneous across a variety of attributes that range from; education, capital, quality of land, 
location of land, to name a few. Individually farmers have very little market power, as they are 
competitive with each other on output, and are relatively small in size when compared to the seed 
industry. 
Farmers are involved in IPPM systems through production and/or marketing contracts. 
The contracts between farmers and other IPPM participants establish the framework for 
production and handling guidelines, as well as incentives for participation and penalties for non-
compliance. Agricultural contracts serve a number of purposes; risk management, increased 
supply chain and marketing efficiency, and stabilization of production (Perry and Banker 2000). 
 18 
The framework of the IPCP involves a production contract between input suppliers and farmers, 
as well as a marketing contract between farmers and the CWB.  
Production contracts act as a tool to manage supply and to establish a framework for the 
relationship between the parties. These contracts stipulate the expected management practices of 
the farmer, and incentives for participation (Perry and Banker 2000). Additionally, the contract 
specifies the level of purity required to meet the minimum standards of the IPPM system. 
The contractor (seed company) and the contractee (farmer) both benefit from involvement 
in the production contract. The contractor benefits from the assurance of a product that meets 
their standards, as well as allowing for inventory management activities through the direction and 
timing of delivery (Perry and Banker 2000). In return for the production of a specific good, the 
contractor shares production and marketing risks with farmers as the contractor has contracted 
control over the commodity being produced (Perry and Banker 2000). However, with the sharing 
of risk comes some concern in terms of a shift in bargaining power from farmers to the input 
suppliers (Harl 2004).  
In return for participating in the production contract, farmers benefit from management of 
risk through guaranteed acceptance of delivery usually at a set price or premium as well as other 
financial incentives for participation. The guarantee of acceptance is dependent on the grain 
meeting minimum standards stipulated by the contract. The production contracts may not 
explicitly state price, but in most cases, a premium is stated (United States Department of 
Agriculture 1996). The premium can come in the form of an input purchase credit to farmers to 
offset the additional costs of involvement in the contract (Kennet et al. 1998). A premium serves 
as a method of attracting sufficient participation within the program in order to guarantee an 
adequate and consistent supply (Phillips and Smyth 2003; Soucie 1997). Production contracts 
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remove much of farmer‟s decision-making ability by stipulating specific input requirements and 
management practices such as crop rotation, buffer zones, cleaning practices, as well as storage 
and transportation procedures (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001). The location of delivery is 
typically a point owned by the grain company involved in the production contract (CWB 2008b). 
A key aspect of production contracts is that farmers do not own the grain they produce in the 
traditional sense, where the contractor maintains ownership for marketing purposes. This causes 
farmer‟s margins in a production contract tied to efficiency of production (Perry and Banker 
2000). This makes production contracts more attractive to farmers who are efficient, educated, 
and capitalized (Phillips and Smyth 2003).  
Marketing contracts are similar to production contracts but farmers maintain ownership of 
the grain and control over production and more able to handle production risk (Perry and Banker 
2000). Marketing contracts are between farmers and the marketer for the sale of a specific good. 
The contract establishes the price, quality (grade), quantity, as well as location and time of 
delivery (Harwood et al. 1999). Marketing contracts reduce the farmer‟s price risk through a 
fixed price or pricing formula thus avoiding the risk associated with spot markets (Katchova and 
Miranda 2004; Perry and Banker 2000).  
Farmers participating in the CWB‟s IPCP require a production and marketing contract. 
The combination of both creates a unique situation where farmers receive the benefit of a 
guaranteed sale and premiums from the contracts, but are subject to the production and lack of 
ownership (United States Department of Agriculture 1996). Farmers benefit from having a buyer 
for their product as well as a stipulated price and the possibility of a premium from both the 
production and marketing contracts. Unfortunately, farmers experience the same lack of product 
ownership and decision making abilities associated with a production contract. However, farmers 
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are in a position to benefit from price and market certainty with little economic production risk 
(Harwood et al. 1999). 
The contracts used in IPPM systems provide stability of supply, allowing the system to 
meet market preferences consistently at a quality and quantity sufficient to satisfy market needs. 
Additionally the contracts act as a revenue management tool to encourage participation in the 
system. Identity preserved production and marketing systems that are unable to provide a 
consistent and adequate supply, at a desired quality, run the risk of the consumer market losing 
confidence in the system, which can result in the programs failure (Smyth and Phillips 2001). 
2.2.4 Grain-handling System 
The grain-handling systems of Western Canada manage the collection and transportation 
of agricultural crops from areas of production to exporters, processors, and consumers. The 
system involves the organization of trucks, rail, and ships for delivery, as well as a network of 
elevators of varying sizes for storage. The operation of grain-handling system begins at harvest, 
where the crop is either transported to an on-farm storage facility to be sold at a later date, or 
directly transported to the local elevator for sale. Once grain enters the elevator it is stored 
awaiting transportation by rail or truck to an export terminal or a processor/consumer.  
The grain-handling industry has been undergoing concentration in terms of number of 
firms as well as facilities. Between 1962-63 and 2009-10 the grain-handling industry reduced the 
number of primary elevators across the prairies from 5,223 to 314 although handling capacity fell 
much less, around 48 percent (Canadian Grain Commission 2009a). The bulk grain-handling 
system experiences efficiencies of scale, where elevator efficiency increases with size (Janzen 
and Wilson 2002). This encouraged the consolidation of small elevators into large super-
terminals that are able to service the same area. Fewer number of elevators results in savings in 
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terms of fuller utilization of assets as well as lower overhead. As such, the grain-handling 
industry favours the handling of a limited number of products at few locations. The consolidation 
of grain-handling industry infrastructure is not well suited to handle IPPM grains as it is 
primarily structured to handle bulk commodity grains (Kennet et al. 1998). The grain-handling 
industry has also undergone consolidation, vertically integrating with the agricultural supply 
chain by providing production inputs to farmers (Wilson and Dahl 1999). This has resulted in a 
concentration of the industry with a small number of firms vertically integrated into the supply 
chain (Canadian Seed Alliance 2004).  
Alignment of the grain-handling system with an IPPM system is through contracts with 
other participants, leading to increased vertical coordination between buyers and sellers (Kennet 
et al. 1998). As coordination of supply chain participants increases, the efficiency of the 
segregation activities will also increase lowering associated costs (Kennett et al. 1998). The 
contracts stipulate the requirements of the participants as well as incentives for participation and 
compliance as well as disincentives for non-compliance. The vertical coordination created by the 
contracts ensures segregation and IP of the crop as it moves through the supply chain. 
Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2001) describes an IPPM grain-handling system as one that co-mingles 
discrete lots of grain that meet program requirements into a flow of grain. As the flow increases 
the IPPM system becomes more akin to a traditional grain-handling system. 
2.2.5 Marketer 
The marketer plays an important role in IPPM systems. They have direct contact with 
intermediate and end consumers; can negotiate prices, make arrangements of delivery, and 
communicate changes in consumer preference. The marketer can be an independent firm, or the 
instigator of the IPPM system. The marketer engages in contract negotiations with consumers for 
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the purchase of the IPPM product at a set price (or premium over commodity markets), and 
possibly the quantity. Negotiation of prices between a marketer and consumer requires the 
marketer to have a firm understanding of the additional costs of producing and delivering an 
IPPM product. In addition to covering the costs, a premium must also be elicited that is sufficient 
to provide an incentive for participation of the supply chain in order to make the IPPM system 
viable (Strayer 2002). Depending on the market, the quantity of product required can be 
determined, thus providing goals for contracted production. The marketer plays an important role 
in communicating consumer preference up the supply chain. This function allows the IPPM 
system to better suit the needs of niche markets, as well as be able to respond to changes in 
consumer preference. The communication channel also allows the marketer to promote new 
products entering the market. IPPM systems will be successful if the marketer promotes their 
products and elicits a sufficient premium for firms in the supply chain.  
2.3 Issues with IPPM Systems  
Identity preserved production and marketing systems are vulnerable to physical and 
economic failures (Rosher 2004). Successful IPPM systems require three components; 
segregation, coordination, and incentives (Rosher 2004). A breakdown in any one of these areas 
can lead to a reduction in efficiency, and in some cases, complete failure. Proper segregation 
ensures purity of product through the supply chain and reduces the chance of contamination 
beyond a specified threshold level. Coordination of participant activities plays an important role 
not only in reducing the systems inefficiencies, but also helps to reduce the potential of physical 
and economic failures. Economic failures can result from failure to elicit sufficient premium from 
the market, or its uneven distribution between participants. Providing a sufficient premium to the 
components of the supply chain is a significant problem for IPPM systems (Phillips and Smyth 
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2003). This problem can arise from discrepancies between participating firms‟ priorities, market 
structure, and profitability (Soucie 1997). Independent firms are required to enter into close 
relationships within the supply chain through cooperation, collaboration, information sharing 
along with showing mutual respect and willingness to share profits and risks (Opara 2003; Soucie 
1997). 
2.3.1 Segregation Issues 
The purpose of segregation within an IPPM system is the prevention of contamination 
that can occur at any stage in the supply chain: production, transportation, or storage. The 
disparity between IPPM system requirements and the current grain-handling infrastructure 
presents opportunities for product purity to be compromised. Identity preservation provides the 
tools for the detection and determination of the point of origin of contamination, as well as tools 
for its prevention. The sampling and paper trail of IP act as a liability minimization tool, as 
failures in segregation can be costly to those responsible. The cost from failures in segregation 
can take the form of losses in revenue, as well as fines that may result from lawsuits (Smyth and 
Phillips 2001). Since a number of firms along the supply chain handle an IPPM product, disputes 
can occur over where contamination occurred. Therefore, in some cases a third party testing 
facility is required to settle these disputes (Canadian Grain Commission 1998; Phillips and Smyth 
2003). The ability to detect and trace segregational failures is important to a fledgling IPPM 
system experiencing growing pains. Not all failures within the system can be caught, as the 
testing of every sample may not be feasible due to costs, raising the importance of trust and the 
reputation of participants (Kennet et al. 1998).  
As stated earlier, segregation during grain transportation and storage are major areas of 
concern as mislabelling and co-mingling can devalue the grain to that of a generalized 
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commodity. The cost of segregation increases with the required level of purity in non-dedicated 
grain paths (Huygen et al. 2004; Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001). As a result, tolerance levels for 
variety impurity are typically around 5% in small lot segregated systems (Smyth and Phillips 
2001). Successful segregation for IP and IPPM systems builds on the supply chains experience 
with grain grading (see appendix A). The success of current IP and IPPM systems in the grain-
handling system indicates that these systems are possible; however, there are increased costs and 
associated liabilities. 
2.3.2 Grain-handling Industry Issues 
The Canadian bulk grain-handling system was not developed nor designed for the unique 
demands of IPPM systems. The conventional grain-handling system was designed to handle large 
quantities of a small number of different grades and classes of grain (Bullock et al. 2002; Vachal 
and Reichert 2000). Consequently, the costs of segregation are higher due the inefficiencies in 
handling both IPPM varieties and conventional classes (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001; Smyth and 
Phillips 2001). Coordination within the grain-handling industry, as well as between the grain-
handling industry and farmers, plays an important role to decrease these systems costs and 
inefficiencies. Other methods of managing segregation including the use of dedicated facilities, 
increased on-farm storage and containerization  
Janzen and Wilson (2002) suggested that grain handlers dedicate separate grain paths for 
IPPM varieties as a method to decrease costs associated with segregation. A dedicated grain path 
can be either a facility that only handles IPPM varieties, or one that handles IPPM and 
conventional varieties with dedicated delivery points for IPPM and non-IPPM grain, as well as 
grain-handling and storage assets that only deal with IPPM varieties. Dedication of separate grain 
paths have a higher cost due to the requirement of increased investment in infrastructure, which 
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results in higher operating costs and lowers the grain-handling infrastructures flexibility (Bullock 
et al. 2002). The establishment of dedicated grain paths is a long-term solution to address the 
unique demands of IPPM systems. Short-term solutions to address the inefficiencies of the 
elevator system are through the coordination between elevators for exclusive handling of specific 
grains. It is proposed (Bullock et al. 2002; Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001) that using older wooden 
elevators could address these requirements in a more cost-effective manner. 
In contrast to dedicated grain-handling paths, non-dedicated grain paths require cleaning 
of common grain-handling equipment, which increases labour costs and can result in extensive 
down time. Increased coordination between elevators and farmers reduces the cost and downtime 
from cleaning by using on-farm storage. On-farm storage allows for increased elevator 
efficiencies by being able to coordinate delivery to minimize the cleaning of shared 
infrastructure. Coordination of delivery also allows farmers to avoid long queues at the elevators 
due to the additional time required for testing and cleaning (Bullock et al. 2002). Identity 
preserved production and marketing systems can offer storage premiums to encourage farmers to 
invest in on-farm storage facilities (CWB 2004b). 
Containerization can provide a solution to handle the specific needs of IPPM systems 
(Reichert and Vachal 2003). Containerization is the use of shipping containers that are mountable 
on tractor-trailers and rail cars that are used to store and transport the grain, minimizing the 
handling of the grain and the threat of contamination. This concept provides IPPM systems with a 
method of transporting units of grain that are too small for the traditional bulk handling system 
(Vachal and Reichert 2000). These containers can enter the IPPM system at the farmer level used 
for initial storage and for transportation to the market. Shipping containers allow for easy 
segregation of specialty grains and for quick and easy transportation to the customer. This 
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increases the speed of transit, and allows for just-in-time inventory management of grain, thereby 
reducing inventory costs and increasing the reliability of the system (Reichert and Vachal 2003). 
The cost of containerization can be major obstacle for its utilization. In 1999, the cost of 
containerization for soybeans was 20% more than that of a grain-handling system using a unit 
train (Vachal and Reichert 2000). While containerization addresses the segregational 
requirements of an IPPM system, the increase in cost can present a barrier for its adoption.  
The current Canadian grain-handling system is not capable of handling a large number of 
IPPM systems. It is suggested that the grain-handling infrastructure has been suggested to require 
a doubling if 25% of all grain was involved in an IPPM system (Smyth and Phillips 2001). The 
proposition of using old wooden elevators as well as containerization and increased on-farm 
storage present short and long-term solutions to deficiencies in the grain-handling infrastructure. 
2.3.3 Production Issues 
Farmers play an integral role in IPPM systems as their activities determine the quantity 
and quality of the product that goes through the supply chain. Problems in quantity or quality can 
easily destroy consumer confidence and loyalty for a branded product. Therefore, a reliable and 
consistent supply for end-users is essential for the success of IPPM systems (Soucie 1997). 
Farmer heterogeneity becomes a challenge in ensuring a reliable and consistent supply. 
Additionally, the demographic of farmers involved affect the quality and quantity of grain being 
sold through both IPPM and non-IPPM channels. Farmer participation is encouraged through the 
contractual arrangement in the form of guaranteed payments and premiums. 
There are a number of factors influencing the ability of farmers to participate in an IPPM 
system. Adopters of IPPM systems tend to be well financed and educated, leaving those farmers 
who are less educated and poorly financed unable to take full advantage of the rents made 
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available in IPPM systems (Phillips and Smyth 2003). Geography is also a factor in a farmer‟s 
ability to participate in IPPM systems as production contracts typically tie farmers to specific 
elevator companies who will cluster production around specific delivery points in order to 
minimize infrastructure and segregation costs. The combination of ability and geography result in 
an uneven distribution of available rents among the population of Western Canadian farmers.  
Geographic concentration is favourable for IPPM systems by increasing the efficiency of 
transportation and storage activities; however, concentration can compromise system stability. A 
wide production base that is spatially diverse provides stability to an IPPM system. Geographic 
concentration limits the number of farmers that are sufficiently educated or capitalized to 
participate in this system. Additionally a concentrated production base increases the impact of a 
single adverse environmental event (frost, flood, drought, etc) on the quantity and quality of grain 
moving through the IPPM system. Stability is important in maintaining consumer loyalty and 
confidence of providing a product at a consistently sufficient quantity at an acceptable quality 
(Janzen and Wilson 2002). 
An issue for the CWB is that the involvement of farmers in IPPM systems may result in a 
decrease in production of non-IPPM grain (Carriquiry and Babcock 2002). With an increase in 
IPPM production relative to non-IPPM production, it can expected to result in a decrease in 
quantity and quality of non-IPPM production as farmers able to produce high quality grain will 
participate in programs that offer greater return. Additionally, it can be expected that farmers 
capable of producing high quality grain to participate in IPPM systems more than less capable 
farmers, as they would face little risk in failing to meet IPPM system requirements. In addition, a 
narrowing of the production base and associated lower quality of non-IPPM grain may 
undermine the CWB pooling program (Kennet et al. 1998; Phillips and Smyth 2003). 
 28 
2.3.4 Incentives 
As stated earlier, the voluntary nature of IPPM systems requires participation at each 
stage of the supply chain to operate properly (Phillips and Smyth 2003). Economic costs are 
present at all stages of the supply chain and if one stage has a disproportionate burden of costs, 
the system has the potential to fail economically (Sundstrom et al. 2002). Participants require an 
opportunity to capture some of the rents generated by the IPPM system. The system must account 
for direct and opportunity costs of participants, and must be able to address market power to 
prevent a single participant from extracting all of the rents. Lack of participation at any stage of 
the supply chain can result in failure to meet consumer preferences, or a non-functioning system. 
Foregone opportunity costs due to infrastructure inefficiencies in the grain-handling 
industry create disincentives for participation in the IPPM system (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001). 
For example, elevators participating in IPPM systems may be unable to take advantage of profit 
maximizing activities of pooling and blending (Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes 2000). 
Additionally, since an IPPM system requires product identity and purity, often for small lots, 
elevator efficiencies decrease with the handling of more products, which causes an 
underutilization of storage and transportation assets (Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes 2000). 
This result in the forgoing of storage margins and carrying spreads. The incentives to the grain-
handling industry have to be large enough to offset the additional costs and lost revenue-
generating activities (Bullock et al. 2002). The presence of economic incentives for segregation 
within the elevator system may be insufficient to cause a rapid overhaul to the system, but 
vertical integration as well as increased revenues from guaranteed delivery allow for continued 
participation (Bullock et al. 2002).  
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Grain-handling companies are undergoing vertical integration into the agricultural supply 
chain (most notably the agricultural input markets). Vertical integration allows the firm to have 
multiple profit points along the supply chain, and greater control over the IPPM system. The 
combination of vertical integration and control over critical inputs increases the grain-handling 
company‟s market power, this coupled with control over the IPPM policies allow for 
opportunistic behaviour and the exertion of market power (Boland et al. 2000; Wells 2006). Seed 
companies influence IPPM systems through agreements and alignments with the IPPM 
proponents that regulate price and the quantity of the IPPM product required to meet market 
demand (Phillips and Smyth 2003). A seed company that has exclusive rights to the input, such 
as the IPRs of seed varieties, may extract the majority of the rents from farmers contracted in the 
IPPM system (Phillips and Smyth 2003). Opportunistic behaviour and exertion of market power 
is present if the difference in cost of certified seed between an IPPM and conventional varieties is 
greater than the premium offered by the IPPM system (Boland et al. 2000; Wells 2006). This 
opportunistic behaviour minimizes the benefit to farmers participating in IPPM systems, further 
limiting the production base as available rents to farmers decrease. 
The estimated costs of IPPM systems have a wide range within the literature due to the 
many variables involved. Examples of these are; opportunity costs, inefficiencies in the grain-
handling system, and segregation costs. Phillips and Smyth (2003) estimated the total cost of 
IPPM systems are $30 to 40/tonne due to the need for extra labour and the sub-optimal use of 
infrastructure. Huygen et al. (2004) estimated the direct cost of segregation, at the 95% purity 
level, to be $1.26/tonne for a non-dedicated grain-handling system, and $1.16/tonne for a 
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dedicated grain-handling system.
9
 The cost of segregation at the farm level was found to be 
$1.04/tonne. While segregation costs at the primary elevator level was $0.11/tonne and 
0.03/tonne for a non-dedicated and dedicated system, respectively. Segregation at an export 
elevator was estimated to be $0.11/tonne and $0.09/tonne for a non-dedicated and dedicated 
system, respectively. The CWB offered a $1.80/tonne special handling fee to the grain and 
handling system to address the additional associated costs (Phillips and Smyth 2003). 
With the cost of IPPM systems estimated to be 15 to 20% more than conventional product 
supply chains (Smyth and Phillips 2001), the price premium generated by an IPPM product may 
be insufficient to cover its additional costs (Sundstrom et al. 2002). Improvements in efficiencies 
are required to bridge the gap between the costs of IPPM systems and the premium for the IPPM 
product. Efficiencies of IPPM systems improve with coordination and participants focusing on 
the needs of the next step in the supply chain (Phillips and Smyth 2003). 
2.4 Future of IPPM 
The future of IPPM systems is dependent upon a number of factors influencing the ability 
of participants to extract rents from the IPPM system, as well as their perception of other 
advantages from IPPM systems. Advancements in technology and changing consumer 
preferences are strong drivers behind the increase in demand for high quality wheat, which 
encourages future development of IPPM systems (Kennet et al. 1998). However, the long-term 
viability and large-scale feasibility of IPPM programs is unknown as these programs have 
historically been small in size and short in duration (Phillips and Smyth 2003). Smyth and 
                                                 
9
 The disagreement between Phillips and Smyth (2003) and Huygen et al. (2004) is that Huygen et al. only examined 
the direct cost for the act of segregation and not all of the indirect and opportunity costs associated with segregation 
systems. 
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Phillips (2001) believe that if trends in consumer preferences continue to influence the supply 
chain, IPPM systems will become commonplace. 
Consumer preference is a strong driver behind the demand for contracted production, 
resulting in an increase in market share of contracted production across commodity markets 
(Martinez and Stewart 2003). American exports of wheat have seen a significant shift towards the 
exporting of premium cultivars since the mid 1990s, which is expected to continue (Reichert and 
Vachal 2003). In 1999, Bender et al. determined that American foreign and domestic markets 
were encouraging the move towards premium cultivars, and 47% of these premium cultivars 
were destined for export markets. As the proportion of IPPM systems increases, it is expected 
that the grain-handling industry will require significant development in its infrastructure to 
handle the large volume of IPPM grain (Smyth and Phillips 2001). 
2.5 Summary 
Development of IPPM systems is a complex undertaking requiring the participation of the 
agriculture supply chain through contracted vertical cooperation. Identity preserved production 
and marketing systems have been operating successfully in Canada for a number of years but are 
still being refined and further developed. These systems can still benefit from participant 
education and development of infrastructure that is suited to meet the needs of IPPM systems. As 
these factors improve, the risks and associated costs will lessen (Kalaitzandonakes et al. 2001). 
Distribution of rents is very important for securing sufficient supply and delivery of the product 
from „field-to-fork‟. Market power, and its exertion, plays an important role in the distribution of 
rents, possibly reducing the overall benefit of the system and discouraging participation. The next 
chapter examines a theoretical framework for the distribution of rents under a variety of policies 
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and market conditions to illustrate the effect of market power on IPPM systems, focusing on 
farmer welfare. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
3 Theoretical Model 
Identity preserved production and marketing (IPPM) systems are designed for the 
development of niche markets and ultimately to extract a premium. The niche markets are 
established or expanded through market development activities that focus on meeting the needs 
of consumers and aligning production with consumption. The market development activities 
increase the value of the product to the market, which can in turn increases the premium offered 
by the market. The distribution of the market premium between IPPM participants is of interest 
as the existence of market power within the IPPM system influences rent distribution. The 
distribution of rents influences the decisions of the IPPM system developer for the creation or 
further development of the niche market. 
The theoretical model provides a simulation of the impact of the IPPM policies on rent 
distribution between participants. Two policies are examined; production constraint, and 
additional market development. The production constraint provides a representation of a niche 
market, where the amount of product available to the market is restricted in order to maintain a 
price premium. In the market development policy, the marketer invests resources into the niche 
market to further increase the markets willingness to pay for the product. The policies‟ impacts 
are examined though a simple vertical model, consisting of two levels. The first level being the 
market for identity preserved (IP) seed consisting of seed companies acting as the suppliers of IP 
seed, and farmers acting as the buyer of IP seed. The second level, the market for IP grain, 
consists of farmers acting as the suppliers of IP grain, and consumers acting as the buyers of IP 
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grain.
10
 The vertical model is a mathematical model which uses graphical representation to 
illustrate rent distribution and to convey the impact of the policies on rent distribution. The model 
demonstrates the impact of an IPPM system on participant welfare from the implementation of a 
production constraint and/or market development activities. 
The two policies, constrained production and market development, are examined 
independently and then jointly in the model, creating four scenarios (see Figure 3.1). The first 
scenario presents the base case where the marketer imposes neither of the policies and acts as a 
broker organizing the IPPM system and facilitating the transactions between the markets. The 
second scenario involves the marketer constraining the quantity of IP grain produced by farmers 
and marketed to the consumers. In the third scenario, the marketer engages in market 
development activities to elicit a price premium, but does not constrain production. The fourth 
scenario is the joint implementation of the policies, where the marketer constrains the quantity of 
IP grain produced and engages in market development activities.  
Within each of the four policy scenarios, the seed industry with three different seed 
ownership structures, demonstrating varying degrees of market power. The three different seed 
ownership structures are; monopolistic, perfectly competitive, and oligopolistic. The perfectly 
competitive seed ownership structure is a special case to assist in explaining the influence of the 
policies on farmer welfare where there is an absence of IPR or is not owned by the seed industry. 
The monopolistic case is where a single firm owns the IPPM variety, (as is the case with 
Navigator durum) and oligopolistic case is where ownership in shared among a small number of 
firms, (e.g. Kyle durum).  
                                                 
10
 The grain-handling industry (elevators and railways) are omitted as they are assumed to be compensated by the 
IPPM system. Seed companies are also often own elevation and transportation companies, which are rewarded 
through the delivery requirement of the production contracts. Rail companies are compensated through higher 
transportation rates for movement of single cars. Therefore, only three participants are included in the model. 
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The three ownership structures combine with the four policy scenarios to create twelve 
situations to model. Figure 3.1 depicts the twelve situations created by the four policy scenarios 
and three ownership structures of the theoretical model.  
 
Figure 3.1: Policy Scenarios and Ownership Structures Analyzed in the Theoretical Model 
 
Each situation is modeled as a two stage game involving the decisions and actions made 
first by the seed industry and then by the farmer. The first stage involves the seed industry 
(supply of IP seed) setting the price and quantity of IP seed.
11
 The second stage involves farmers 
(demand for IP seed, and supply of IP grain) deciding if they will participate in the IP program, 
farmers will become involved in the program till the farmer price of IP grain is equal to marginal 
cost. With consumer and farmers decisions taken as given, the exertion of market power by the 
marketer and seed industry will determine rent distribution through the determination of the 
quantity and price of IP seed.  
Participants are organized in the vertical alignment using the following assumptions. Seed 
companies are the marketers of IP seed, and assumed to be rational and profit maximizing. Seed 
companies produce IP seed at a constant marginal cost equal to average cost. Farmers are 
numerous and price takers that competitively produce IP grain at marginal cost, which is upward 
sloping in aggregate production. Consumers of IP grain are price takers, and in aggregate have 
                                                 
11
 In the case of constrained production the seed industry is assumed to set quantity equal to the constraint. 
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downward sloping demand curve. The IPPM marketer (i.e. the CWB) function as a facilitator for 
the vertical market representing consumers of IP grain, and is the instigator of the proposed 
policy scenarios. The marketer only charges the cost of marketing; as such, the consumer price of 
grain is the marketer‟s price offered to farmers. The quantity of IP grain and quantity of IP seed 
have a direct relationship, where one unit of IP seed produces one unit of IP grain.  
Model assumptions:  
 Demand for IP grain and supply for IP grain are known and transparent 
 Market power is only possessed by the marketer and seed companies 
 Consumers and farmers are numerous and are price takers 
 Farmers are rational and will produce grain till price is equal to marginal cost 
 Seed companies are rational profit maximizing firms 
 Marginal cost of IP seed is constant and equal to the average cost of seed 
 One unit of IP seed produces one unit of IP grain 
3.1 Scenario 1: Base Case 
The base case provides a measurement tool for examining the impact of the proposed 
marketer‟s policies on the welfare of consumer, farmers and the seed industry. As stated in the 
introduction, a vertical model represents the markets, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2a 
represents the market for IP grain, and Figure 3.2b represents the market for IP seed.  
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Figure 3.2: Scenario 1 – Base Case 
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The market for IP grain is composed of consumer demand for IP grain and farmer supply 
of IP grain. The inverse consumer demand for IP grain, equation (3.1), is assumed to be 
transparent with a known downward sloping demand curve.  
i
j
i
j bQaP   
(3.1) 
Where ijP  = consumer price of IP grain in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
 a = undifferentiable price of IP grain 
 b = differentiable price of IP grain 
 ijQ  = quantity of IP grain in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
The inverse farmer supply of IP grain, equation (3.2), is assumed to be transparent with a 
known upward sloping supply curve.  
i
j
i
j QF    (3.2) 
Where ijF  = farmer price of IP grain in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
 α = undifferentiable cost of producing IP grain 
 β = differentiable cost of producing IP grain 
The upward sloping marginal cost curve of the supply for IP grain represents the 
heterogeneity of producers, and the increasing cost of producing IP grain on land that is less 
suitable for IP grain production. It is assumed that the costs of producing IP grain is equal to the 
costs of producing conventional grain, plus the cost associated with involvement in an IP 
program (segregation, contracting, etc.) as illustrated in equation (3.3).  
IPConv    
 
(3.3) 
Where Conv  = undifferentiable cost of producing conventional grain 
 IP  = undifferentiable cost associated with involvement in an IP program 
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The market for IP seed is composed of farmer demand for IP seed and seed company 
supply of IP seed. The inverse demand for IP seed can be obtained from the vertical market 
orientation from the inverse consumer demand for IP grain, equation (3.1), and the inverse farmer 
supply of IP grain, equation (3.2), which is represented by equation (3.4) and can be rewritten as 
equation (3.5). 
    ij
i
j
i
j
i
j QbaFPS    (3.4) 
 
 




b
Sa
Q
i
ji
j  
(3.5) 
Where ijS  = price of IP seed in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
With the marginal revenue for IP seed equal to equation (3.6).  
    ijj QbaMR   2  (3.6) 
Where MR j = marginal revenue for the demand for IP seed in scenario j 
Seed companies marginal cost of IP seed, equation (3.7), is constant and equal to average 
cost of IP seed.  
kACMC   (3.7) 
Where MC  = marginal cost of IP seed 
 AC = average cost of IP seed 
Distribution of rents is calculated through Marshallian surpluses and seed company rents. 
Marshallian surpluses take advantage of the linear supply and demand curves producing a 
consumer surplus of IP grain equal to equation (3.8), and producer surplus of IP grain equal to 
equation (3.9).
12
 
                                                 
12
 Deadweight loss is not measured in this analysis as part of the dead weight loss is from (foreign) consumers that 
are not normally considered as part of a domestic policy decision.  
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    2
22
1 i
j
i
j
i
j
i
j Q
b
PaQCS   
(3.8) 
Where ijCS   = consumer surplus of IP grain in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
    2
22
1 i
j
i
j
i
j
i
j QFQPS

   
(3.9) 
Where ijPS  = producer surplus of IP grain in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
The presence of market power in the seed industry creates the opportunity for the seed 
company to capture rents from the system as illustrated in equation (3.10). 
 kSQ ijijij   (3.10) 
Where ij   = seed company rents in scenario j with i seed ownership structure 
3.1.1 Scenario 1: Monopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The first case has the seed industry presented with a monopolistic seed ownership 
structure maximizing profits by setting the price of the IP seed, equation (3.11), where marginal 
revenue of IP seed, equation (3.6), is equal to the marginal cost of IP seed, equation (3.7).  
 
2
1
ka
S M



 
(3.11) 
Quantity of IP seed, equation (3.12), is obtained by substituting equation (3.11) into 
equation (3.5). 











b
ka
QM
2
1
1  
(3.12) 
Seed company rents, equation (3.13), is obtained by substituting equation (3.11) and 
(3.12) into equation (3.10). The seed company rents are illustrated in Figure 3.2b by area 
[ MS1 ,
CS1 , I, J]. 
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 
 





b
kaM
4
2
1  
(3.13) 
Consumer price of IP grain, equation (3.14), and farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.15), 
are obtained by substituting equation (3.12) into equation (3.1) and (3.2), respectively.  











b
kab
aPM
2
1  
(3.14) 












b
ka
F M
2
1  
(3.15) 
Consumer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.16), and producer surplus of IP grain, equation 
(3.17), are obtained by substituting equation (3.12) into equation (3.8) and (3.9), respectively. 
The Marshallian surpluses in the market for IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.2a where consumer 
surplus of IP grain is illustrated by area [a, MP1 , B], and producer surplus of IP grain is illustrated 
by area [ MF1 ,  , A].  
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(3.16) 
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(3.17) 
3.1.2 Scenario 1: Perfectly Competitive Seed Ownership Structure 
The second case of scenario one has the seed industry presented with a perfectly 
competitive seed ownership structure setting the price of IP seed equal to the marginal cost of IP 
seed, equation (3.7), resulting in seed company rents being equal to zero. The competitive 
quantity of IP seed, equation (3.18), is obtained by substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.5). 





b
ka
QC1  
(3.18) 
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The consumer price of IP grain, equation (3.19), and farmer price of IP grain, equation 
(3.20), are obtained by substituting equation (3.18) into equation (3.1) and (3.2), respectively. 











b
ka
baPC1  
(3.19) 
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(3.20) 
Consumer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.21), and producer surplus of IP grain, equation 
(3.22), are obtained by substituting equation (3.18) into equation (3.8) and (3.9), respectively. 
The distribution of Marshallian surpluses to the market for IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.2a 
where consumer surplus of IP grain is illustrated by area [a, CP1 , E], and producer surplus of IP 
grain is illustrated by area [ CF1 ,  , D]. 
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(3.22) 
3.1.3 Scenario 1: Oligopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The third case presents an oligopolistic seed ownership structure. The price and quantity 
of IP seed depends on the degree of market power exerted by the seed industry. To illustrate the 
potential range of prices and quantities conjectural variation is used (Perry 1982). Conjectural 
variation states that the price of IP seed will exist between the perfectly competitive price of IP 
seed and the monopolistic price of IP seed. Market power (δ) is presented to have a range of 
[0,1], zero representing a perfectly competitive market, and one representing a monopolistic 
market. Conjectural variation of the price of IP seed is represented by equation (3.23). 
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C
j
M
j
O
j SSS )1(    (3.23) 
Where δ = market power of seed industry [0,1] 
The price of IP seed, equation (3.24), is obtained by substituting equation (3.11) and (3.7) 
into equation (3.23).  
k
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  
(3.24) 
The quantity of IP seed, equation (3.25), is obtained by substituting equation (3.24) into 
equation (3.5).  















2
11



b
ka
QO  
(3.25) 
The consumer price of IP grain, equation (3.26), and farmer price of IP grain, equation 
(3.27), are obtained by substituting equation (3.25) into equation (3.1) and (3.2), respectively. 
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Consumer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.28), and producer surplus of IP grain, equation 
(3.29), are obtained by substituting equation (3.25) into equation (3.8) and (3.9), respectively. 
Consumer surplus is illustrated in Figure 3.2a by area [a, OP1 , H]. Producer surplus of IP grain is 
illustrated in Figure 3.2a by area [ OF1 ,  , G]. 
2
1
2
1
2
























b
kab
CS O  
(3.28) 
2
1
2
1
2
























b
ka
PS O  
(3.29) 
 44 
The seed company rents, equation (3.30), is obtained by substituting equation (3.24) and 
(3.25) into equation (3.10). The seed companies rents are illustrated in Figure 3.2b by area      
[ OS1 , 
CS1 , K, L]. 
 
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(3.30) 
3.2 Scenario 2: Production Constraints 
The second scenario introduces a production constraint, where the marketer sets the 
quantity of IP grain to be sold to consumers. The impact of the production constraint is illustrated 
in Figure 3.3. The market for IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.3a, with the market for IP seed 
illustrated in Figure 3.3b. Figure 3.3 features scenario one and scenario two, each represented by 
the grey and black lines and text, respectively. The introduction of the policy results in the 
demand for IP grain becoming kinked at the constrained quantity IPQ , changing the demand 
curve from  QP1  to  QP2 . The change in the demand curve for IP grain resulting in a kinked 
demand for IP seed changing the demand curve from  QS1  to  QS2 .  
It is assumed that the seed industry produces a quantity of seed sufficient to meet the 
constrained production set by the marketer, regardless of the market structure of the seed industry 
( COMIP QQQQ 222  ). It is assumed that the constrained quantity of seed lies between that of 
the monopoly quantity and the perfectly competitive quantity of scenario one ( CIPM QQQ 11  ). 
From the assumption previously stated about consumers being price takers, the constrained 
consumer price of IP grain will be set equal to equation (3.31) for all cases.  
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IPIP bQaP 2  (3.31) 
Where IPP2  = constrained consumer price of IP grain 
IPQ  = constrained quantity of IP grain 
The consumer surplus of IP grain will remain stationary for all cases as a result of the 
consumer price of IP grain remaining stationary at IPP2 . The consumer surplus of IP grain, 
equation (3.32), is obtained by substituting IPQ  into equation (3.8). The consumer surplus of IP 
grain is illustrated in Figure 3.3a by area [a, IPP2 , B].  
 22
2
IPIP Q
b
CS   
(3.32) 
As a result of consumer price of IP grain remaining stationary at IPP2  and quantity set to 
IPQ , the farmer price of IP grain cannot be obtained using equation (3.2). To calculate the farmer 
price of IP grain a rearrangement of equation (3.4) is required as illustrated in equation (3.33). 
i
j
i
j
i
j SPF   (3.33) 
The constraint on quantity allows for farmers to extract rents from the system, thus 
requiring a different equation for producer surplus of IP grain as illustrated in equation (3.34). 
     IPIPijIPij QQFQPS 


2
2
 
(3.34) 
The basis of comparison between the scenarios is the difference in producer surplus of IP 
grain between scenarios as illustrated in equation (3.35). 
i
j
i
l
i
lj PSPSPS  ,  (3.35) 
Where 
i
ljPS ,  = change in producer surplus under an i seed ownership structure from 
scenario j to scenario l 
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Figure 3.3: Scenario 2 – Production Constraint 
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In order to compare the producer surplus of IP grain between scenarios the constrained 
quantity requires modification to show the relationship of the quantities of IP grain between 
scenarios. Equation (3.36) shows the representation between the constrained and unconstrained 
quantities. Where i ljQ ,  is the absolute change in quantity from scenario j to scenario l, under 
ownership structure i. Based upon the previously stated assumption that COIPM QQQQ 111 
13
 
the sign of the equation will be positive for a monopolistic seed ownership structure, and negative 
for oligopolistic or perfectly competitive seed ownership structures. 
i
lj
i
j
IP QQQ ,  (3.36) 
Where i ljQ ,  = change in quantity from scenario j to l with i seed ownership structure 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the relationship between rent distribution and Marshallian surpluses 
within the vertical market. The figure shows the oligopolistic case of scenario two outlining the 
producer surplus of IP grain, consumer surplus of IP grain, and seed company rents. The 
producer surplus of IP grain is represented in Figure 3.4a by the trapezoid [ OF2 ,  , A, C], 
labelled areas M and N. Consumer surplus of IP grain is represented in Figure 3.4a by the 
triangle [a, IPP2 , B], labelled as area 
OCS2 . The cost of IP seed to farmers is also included in 
Figure 3.4a, represented by area [ IPP2 , 
OF2 , C, B], which is composed of the seed companies cost 
of producing IP seed (k), and seed company rents represented by the area O2 . These areas are 
echoed in the market for IP seed, Figure 3.4b, where the area [(a- ), MS2 , Y] represents the sum 
of consumer surplus of IP grain as well as a portion of producer surplus of IP grain represented 
by the area N. Rents extracted by seed industry and farmers is illustrated by the area [ MS2 , k, V, 
                                                 
13
 It is assumed that the oligopoly quantity of IP seed discovered in scenario one is greater than the constrained 
quantity of IP seed. This is further explained in section 3.2.3 
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Y], composed of seed companies rents, area O2 , and a portion of the producer surplus of IP grain 
represented by area M. 
The impact of the constrained production policy is examined in three cases representing 
different seed ownership structures; monopolistic, perfect competition, and oligopolistic. The 
analysis begins by calculating the price of IP seed and farmer price of IP grain, as well as seed 
company rents and Marshallian surpluses for farmers and consumers. Followed by a comparison 
between scenario two and scenario one for welfare distribution of each case. 
Scenario Assumptions: 
 Seed industry will produce the quantity of seed required for the constrained production, 
regardless of seed ownership structure such that COMIP QQQQ 222  . 
 Constrained quantity lies between the unconstrained monopoly and unconstrained 
perfectly competitive quantities ( CIPM QQQ 11  ). 
 Consumer price of IP grain remains stationary at IPP2 , and consumer surplus of IP grain 
remains stationary at IPCS 2 . 
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Figure 3.4: Illustration of Distribution of Marshallian Surpluses 
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3.2.1 Scenario 2: Monopolist Seed Ownership Structure 
The introduction of a production constraint when there is a monopolistic seed ownership 
structure requires the seed company to cooperate with the marketer‟s policy and provide a 
quantity sufficient to meet supply, as per the assumptions stated in section 3.2. A monopolistic 
firm operating under the production constraint would charge the highest possible price in order to 
maximize returns, as per the assumptions about the seed industry being a profit maximizing firm. 
As a result, the monopolistic firm would arrive at the corner solution for the price of IP seed 
equal to equation (3.37).  
    IPM QbaS  2  (3.37) 
With quantity set to IPQ , seed company rents will be equal to equation (3.38), which is 
obtained by substituting equation (3.37) and IPQ  into equation (3.10). Seed company rents 
decrease from the constrained supply, as the right hand portion of the equation is negative. Seed 
company rents are illustrated in Figure 3.3b by the area [ MS2 , 
CS2 , V, Y]. 
        




 

2
2,1122
ka
QbQQbkaQ IPMMIPIPM

  
(3.38) 
The farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.39), is obtained by substituting equation (3.37) 
into equation (3.33).  
IPM QF  2  (3.39) 
Producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.40), is obtained by substituting equation (3.39) 
into equation (3.34). 
 22
2
IPM QPS

  
(3.40) 
 51 
The change in producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.41), can be obtained by 
substituting equation (3.17), (3.40) and (3.36) into equation (3.35). This is illustrated in Figure 
3.3a by area [ MF2 ,  , A]. 
  MMMM QQQPS 12,12,12,1 2
2


 
(3.41) 
Therefore, if MIP QQ 1  the production constraint policy increases producer surplus of IP 
grain. 
The impact of a production constraint results in a net increase in welfare for farmers and 
consumers at the expense of seed company profits. Producer surplus of IP grain increases from 
the implementation of a production constraint and the associated increase in quantity of seed. 
From equation (3.41) farmers are determined to be better off from the implementation of a 
production constraint when faced with a monopolistic seed ownership structure.  
3.2.2 Scenario 2: Perfectly Competitive Seed Ownership Structure 
A production constraint in a perfectly competitive seed ownership structure maintains the 
same price of IP seed as the base case, equal to equation (3.7). The consumer price of IP grain is 
again taken as IPP2 . The farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.42), is obtained by substituting 
equation (3.7) and (3.31) into equation (3.33).  
  IPC bQkaF 2  (3.42) 
Producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.43), is obtained by substituting equation (3.42) 
into equation (3.34). The producer surplus of IP grain from the implementation of a production 
constraint is illustrated in Figure 3.3a by area [ CF2 ,  , A, B].  
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       IPIPIPC QQbkaQPS   22
2
 
(3.43) 
The introduction of a production constraint in a perfectly competitive seed ownership 
structure can result in a positive or negative impact on farmer welfare based on the difference 
between the constrained and unconstrained quantity. The change in producer surplus of IP grain, 
equation (3.44), is obtained by substituting equation (3.22), (3.36) and (3.43) into equation 
(3.35).  









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

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




 CIPCCCCC QbQQQbbQQPS 2,12,12,112,12,1
22

 
(3.44) 
The change in producer surplus of IP grain is dependent on the degree of reduction in 
quantity. A reduction in quantity greater than the critical change in quantity results in a decrease 
in producer surplus of IP grain. The critical change in quantity, equation (3.45), is obtained by 
equating the partial derivative of equation (3.44) with respect to CQ 2,1 , to zero and solving for 
CQ 2,1 .  
 





b
bQ
Q
PS
critQ
C
C
C
C
2
1
2,1
2,1
2,1  
(3.45) 
Where  critQClj ,  = the change in quantity where producer surplus of IP grain is equal in 
scenario j and l 
3.2.3 Scenario 2: Oligopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The introduction of a production constraint within an oligopolistic seed ownership 
structure demonstrates the potential to increase or decrease Marshallian surpluses depending on 
the degree of market power (δ). Producer surplus of IP grain will increase if δ > λ where λ is a 
value for δ such that IPO SS 21  , resulting in an increase in quantity from the unconstrained case 
( IPO QQ 1 ). Whereas if δ < λ producer surplus of IP grain will change in accordance to the 
 53 
degree of market power possessed by the seed industry, and not result in the monopoly solution. 
For the purposes of illustration it is assumed that δ < λ. 
The price of IP seed, equation (3.46), is obtained by substituting equation (3.7) and (3.37) 
into equation (3.23). The price of IP seed decreases relative to the decrease in the monopoly price 
of seed [  IPMOO SSSS 2121   ]. 
     kQbkaS IPO  2  (3.46) 
Seed company rents, equation (3.47), is obtained by substituting equation (3.46) and IPQ  
into equation (3.10). Seed company rents are illustrated in Figure 3.3b by the area [ OS2 ,
CS2 , V, 
W]. 
          OOOIPIPO QbkaQQbkaQ 2,12,112    (3.47) 
The farmer price of IP seed, equation (3.48), is obtained by substituting equation (3.46) 
and (3.31) into equation (3.33).  
      IPIPO QbQkaF   12   (3.48) 
Producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.49), is obtained by substituting equation (3.48) 
into equation (3.34), and is illustrated in Figure 3.3a by area [ OF2 ,  , A, C].  
         IPIPIPO QbkaQQPS   1
2
2
2   
(3.49) 
The change in producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.50), is obtained by substituting 
equation (3.29), (3.36) and (3.49) into equation (3.35). 
            IPIPOOOO QbkaQQQQPS   1
2
2,11
2
2,12,1  
(3.50) 
The change in producer surplus of IP grain is dependent on the degree of market power 
possessed by the seed industry. As seed market power diminishes Marshallian surpluses 
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decreases as the change from the unconstrained quantity to the constrained quantity ( OIP QQ 1 ), 
increasing the deadweight loss. As with the perfectly competitive case, the increase in farmer 
rents can offset the decrease in producer surplus in the market for IP grain. Market power 
determines if the introduction of a production constraint will increase or decrease the producer 
surplus of IP grain. The degree of market power where there is no change in producer surplus of 
IP grain from scenario one to scenario two is referred to as the critical value for market power. 
This critical value for market power, equation (3.51), is calculated by equating the partial 
derivative of equation (3.50) with respect to   to zero and solving for .  
 
 
  






 
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2
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22
2,1
2
12
C
IPMC
Q
QFF
crit

   
(3.51) 
Where  critlj ,  = value of  where change in producer surplus from scenario j to scenario l 
equals zero 
3.2.4 Production Constraint: Summary 
The introduction of a constrained quantity resulted in shifts of welfare between seed 
companies, farmers and consumers. The price of IP seed was seen to decrease in the monopoly 
and oligopoly seed ownership cases. Producer surplus of IP grain was shown to always be 
increasing in the monopoly case, while experiencing possible losses or gains in the perfectly 
competitive and oligopolistic cases. The benefit of the policy to farmers in the perfectly 
competitive seed ownership structure is dependent on the size of the constrained quantity relative 
to the unconstrained quantity (see equation (3.44)). While producer surplus of IP grain in the 
oligopolistic seed ownership structure is dependent upon the degree of market power possessed 
by the seed industry, with producer surplus of IP grain decreasing with market power (see 
equation (3.51)). The increases to producer surplus of IP grain and seed company profits are a 
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result of the production constraint capturing benefit from consumers of IP grain. The 
implementation of the policy does present farmers with the opportunity to extract rents from the 
system under an oligopoly or perfect competitive seed ownership structure, provided there is 
sufficient market power in the seed industry relative to the change in quantity. In all cases the 
implementation of this policy results in a decrease in rents for seed companies. 
3.3 Scenario 3: Market Development Activities 
In scenario three, market development activities are introduced to increase farmer welfare 
and encourage farmer participation in the IPPM system. The market development activities create 
a price premium in the market for IP grain, increasing the undifferentiated price of IP grain. The 
impact of the market development activities on the market for IP grain and market for IP seed is 
illustrated in Figure 3.5 panel a and b, respectively. Figure 3.5 illustrates the prices and quantities 
discovered in scenario one and the prices and quantities of scenario three presented as grey and 
black, respectively. The price premium affects the market for IP grain through a shift in the 
intercept of the consumer demand of IP grain from a to (a+R), causing the demand curve to shift 
from  QP1  to  QP3 , represented by equation (3.52). 
  ii bQRaP 33    (3.52) 
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Figure 3.5: Scenario 3 – Market Development Activities 
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The vertical market structure causes the introduction of market development activities to 
result in a similar upward shift in the demand for IP seed from  QS1  to  QS3 , illustrated in 
equation (3.53). This in turn changes the market of IP seed marginal revenue from 1MR  to 3MR , 
represented by equation (3.54). 
    ii QbRaS 33     (3.53) 
    iQbRaMR 33 2     (3.54) 
Scenario Assumptions: 
 The market development activities create a premium in the market for IP grain as 
reflected by the upward shift in demand for IP grain 
3.3.1 Scenario 3: Monopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The introduction of market development activities in the monopoly case has the seed 
industry reacting to the new marginal revenue curve for the demand for IP seed. The monopoly 
quantity of IP seed is obtained by equating equation (3.54) to equation (3.7), arriving at equation 
(3.55).  
   






b
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22
13   
(3.55) 
The increase in demand for IP seed also results in an increase in the price of IP seed. The 
price of IP seed, equation (3.56), is obtained by substituting equation (3.55) into equation (3.4). 
The price of IP seed increases equal to half of the price premium. 
22
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R
S
Rka
S MM 



  
(3.56) 
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The overall impact of the policy on the seed company is a shift in seed company rents to 
equation (3.57), which is obtained by substituting equation (3.55) and (3.56) into equation (3.10). 
The seed company rents are illustrated in Figure 3.5b by area [ MS3 , 
CS3 , W, X].  
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(3.57) 
Consumer price of IP grain also increases from the base case capturing a portion of the 
price premium. The consumer price of IP grain, equation (3.58), is obtained by substituting 
equation (3.55) into equation (3.52).  
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(3.58) 
The consumer surplus of IP grain will increase from the base case from the increase in 
consumer price of IP grain and increase in quantity of IP grain. The consumer surplus of IP grain, 
equation (3.59), is obtained by substituting equation (3.55) into equation (3.8). The consumer 
surplus of IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.5a by area [(a+R), MP3 , B]. 
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(3.59) 
The farmer price of IP grain increases from the increase in quantity. The farmer price of 
IP grain, equation (3.60), is obtained by substituting equation (3.55) into equation (3.2).  
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(3.60) 
The increase in farmer price of IP grain, and quantity of IP grain, results in the producer 
surplus of IP grain increasing from the base case. The producer surplus of IP grain, equation 
(3.61), is obtained by substituting equation (3.55) into equation (3.9), which is illustrated in 
Figure 3.5a by area [ MF3 ,  , A]. 
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(3.61) 
The overall impact of the market development activities is an increase in welfare for all 
three participants. The increase Marshallian surpluses to all participants are accompanied by an 
increase in deadweight loss, or portion of uncaptured welfare resulting from the introduction of 
the market development activities. The majority of the capturable rents are shown to be extracted 
by the seed company, extracting half of the capturable effect of the market development 
activities, as can be seen from equation (3.56). The remainder of the premium is distributed 
between farmers and consumers based on the relative difference of slope coefficients, as can be 
seen from equation (3.58) and (3.60).  
3.3.2 Scenario 3: Perfect Competitive Seed Ownership Structure 
Introduction of market development activities with a perfectly competitive seed 
ownership structure sees the price of IP seed remain the same as the base case, with price of IP 
seed equal to equation (3.7). The quantity of IP seed increases as a result of the upward shift 
caused by the market development activities in the demand for IP seed. The quantity of IP seed, 
equation (3.62), is obtained by substituting equation (3.7) into equation (3.53) and solving 
for CQ3 .  
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(3.62) 
The consumer price of IP grain increases from the base case from the increase in quantity 
of IP grain. The consumer price of IP grain, equation (3.63), is obtained by substituting equation 
(3.62) into equation (3.52).  
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Consumer surplus of IP grain increases from the base case from the increase in consumer 
price of IP grain and increase in quantity of IP grain. Consumer surplus of IP grain, equation 
(3.64), is obtained by substituting equation (3.62) into equation (3.8). The consumer surplus of IP 
grain is illustrated in Figure 3.5a by area [(a+R), CP3 , D].  
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(3.64) 
The farmer price of IP grain also increases from the base case from the market 
development activities. This is illustrated in equation (3.65), where equation (3.62) is substituted 
into equation (3.2). 
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(3.65) 
The producer surplus of IP grain increases from the base case from of the introduction of 
the market development activities. The producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.66), is obtained 
by substituting equation (3.62) into equation (3.9). The producer surplus of IP grain is illustrated 
in Figure 3.5a by area [ CF3 , , E].  
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(3.66) 
The introduction of the market development activities in the presence of a perfectly 
competitive seed ownership structure causes an increase in consumer surplus of IP grain and 
producer surplus of IP grain. The entire premium is shown to be captured by the consumers and 
farmers and is distributed based on their relative slope coefficients. 
3.3.3 Scenario 3: Oligopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The introduction of market development activities in the presence of an oligopolistic seed 
ownership structure results in an increase in price of IP seed and quantity of IP seed. The price of 
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IP seed, equation (3.67), is obtained by substituting equation (3.7) and (3.56) into equation 
(3.23).  
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(3.67) 
The quantity of IP seed, equation (3.68), is obtained by substituting equation (3.67) into 
equation (3.5). 
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(3.68) 
The price and quantity solution provides an estimation of the oligopolies rents extracted 
from the system. The oligopolies rents, equation (3.69), is obtained by substituting equation 
(3.67) and (3.68) into equation (3.10). Seed company rents are illustrated in Figure 3.5b by area 
[ OS3 , 
CS3 , Y, Z].  
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(3.69) 
The consumer price of IP grain increases from the increase in price and quantity of IP 
seed. The consumer price of IP grain, equation (3.70), is obtained by substituting equation (3.68) 
into equation (3.52).  
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(3.70) 
The consumer surplus of IP grain increases from the increase in quantity of IP grain, and 
the relative decrease in consumer price of IP grain. The consumer surplus of IP grain, equation 
(3.71), is obtained by substituting equation (3.68) into equation (3.8). The consumer surplus of IP 
grain is illustrated in Figure 3.5a by area [(a+R), OP3 , H]. 
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The farmer price of IP grain also decreases as a result of the downward shift in the supply 
of IP grain. The farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.72), is obtained by substituting equation 
(3.68) into equation (3.2). 
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(3.72) 
The impact of the market development activities on the producer surplus of IP grain is 
positive as a result of the increase in quantity of IP grain and farmer price of IP grain. The 
producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.73), is obtained by substituting equation (3.68) into 
equation (3.9). This is illustrated in Figure 3.5a by area [ OF3 ,  , G].  
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(3.73) 
From the results it can concluded that the introduction market development activities in 
an oligopoly seed ownership structure results in an increase in welfare for all three parties. 
Distribution of rents is dependent on the degree of market power possessed by the seed 
companies, with the remainder of rents distributed between the consumer and farmer depending 
on the slope coefficients of the demand of IP grain and supply of IP grain. 
3.3.4 Market Development Activities: Summary 
The introduction of market development activities creates an increase in welfare for all 
three participants in all three seed ownership structures, with seed company rents in the perfectly 
competitive ownership structure remaining the same. The distribution of rents generated by the 
market development activities is dependent on the degree of market power possessed by the seed 
industry as well as the slope coefficients of the supply of IP grain and demand for IP grain. The 
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introduction of market development activities has the desired effect of increasing farmer 
participation in the program by allowing more land that is marginal for the production of IP grain 
to become involved in the program, and to increase returns to farmers already participating in the 
program. 
3.4 Scenario 4: Production Constraints and Market Development Activities. 
Scenario four is a combination of the policies presented in scenario two and three; 
constrained production, and market development activities. This scenario illustrates the impact of 
market development activities in a constrained production on farmer welfare. This scenario 
addresses the question of “Do farmers benefit from market development activities in a 
constrained production where the seed industry possesses market power?” The joint introduction 
of these policies is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.6 represents the market for IP grain and 
market for IP seed in panel a and b, respectively. The black lines and text in Figure 3.6 represent 
the current scenario, while the grey lines and text corresponding to scenario two. The scenario 
holds the assumptions stated in scenario two and scenario three. The constrained quantity is 
assumed to be the same as that in scenario two. In addition the constrained quantity is assumed to 
be greater than the unconstrained monopoly quantity in scenario three, and less than the 
unconstrained oligopoly and perfectly competitive quantities in scenario three 
( COIPM QQQQ 333  ). 
This scenario examines the impact of market development activities on constrained 
production with respect to the price of IP seed, farmer price of IP grain, and distribution of rents. 
The market development activities results in a premium shifting the demand for IP grain from 
 QP1  to  QP3 . The production constraint results in a kinked demand for IP grain at 
IPQ , 
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shifting the demand for IP grain curve from  QP3  to  QP4 . The culmination of the shift in the 
supply and demand curves in the market for IP grain results in a series of shifts in the demand for 
IP seed from  QS1  to  QS3  and then to  QS4 . 
From the impact of the production constraint and the assumptions from scenario two, the 
consumer price of IP seed will be equal to equation (3.74) for all seed ownership structures, 
which is obtained by substituting IPQ  into equation (3.52). 
  IPIP bQRaP 4  (3.74) 
As per the assumptions, the consumer surplus of IP grain will remain at equation (3.75) 
for all seed ownership structures, which is obtained by substituting IPQ  into equation (3.8). The 
consumer surplus of IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.6a by area [(a+R), IPP4 , A]. 
 24
2
IPIP Q
b
CS   
(3.75) 
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Figure 3.6: Scenario 4 – Market Development Activities and Production Constraint 
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The following assumptions are held for scenario four: 
 Seed industry will produce the quantity of seed required for the constrained production, 
regardless of seed ownership structure such that COMIP QQQQ 4444   
 Constrained quantity is greater than the unconstrained monopoly quantity in scenario 
three, and less than the unconstrained oligopoly and perfectly competitive quantities in 
scenario three ( COIPM QQQQ 333  ) 
 Constrained quantity is the same as in scenario two 
 Consumer price of IP grain remains stationary at IPP4 , and consumer surplus of IP grain 
remains stationary at IPCS4  
3.4.1 Scenario 4: Monopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The monopolistic seed company is faced with being unable to charge the profit 
maximizing price and will charge the highest possible price arriving at the corner solution. The 
price of IP seed, equation (3.76), is obtained by substituting IPQ  into equation (3.53). The seed 
industry is shown to capture the entire premium through the increase in the price of IP seed.  
    RSQbRaS MIPM  24    (3.76) 
Seed company rents, equation (3.77), are obtained by substituting IPQ  and equation 
(3.76) into equation (3.10). Seed company rents illustrate the capturing of the price premium and 
all of the rents generated by it. The seed company rents are illustrated in Figure 3.6b by area 
[ IPS4 , 
CS4 , Z, Y]. 
     IPMIPIPM RQQbRkaQ  24    (3.77) 
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The farmer price of IP grain will remain unchanged from the farmer price of IP grain 
found in scenario two. The farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.78), is obtained by substituting 
equation (3.74) and (3.76) into equation (3.33). 
MIPM FQF 24     (3.78) 
The market development activities have no impact on in the farmer price of IP grain, 
resulting in no transfer of benefit from the market development activities to farmers. This is 
echoed in the producer surplus of IP grain remaining the same as that found in scenario two. The 
producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.79), is obtained by substituting equation (3.78) into 
equation (3.34). The producer surplus of IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.6a by area [ MF4 , α, B]. 
  MIPM PSQPS 2
2
4
2


  
(3.79) 
The introduction of the market development activities and constrained production policies 
results in an increase in farmer price of IP seed from IPS2  to 
IPS4 , which is equal to R. Farmer 
welfare increased as a result of the constrained production, as was demonstrated in scenario two, 
but failed to increase as a result of the market development activities as seen in scenario three. 
The change in producer surplus of IP grain from scenario one to scenario four, equation (3.80), is 
obtained by substituting equation (3.17) and (3.79) into equation (3.35), which is equal to the 
change in producer surplus between scenario one and scenario two. 
   MMMMM PSQQQPS 2,114,14,14,1 2
2


  
(3.80) 
3.4.2 Scenario 4: Perfect Competitive Seed Ownership Structure 
The introduction of the policies jointly into a perfectly competitive seed ownership 
structure will demonstrate the maximum benefit available to farmers. The price of IP seed will be 
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equal to equation (3.7), and the consumer price of IP grain will remain equal to equation (3.74), 
as per the assumptions. The farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.81), is obtained by substituting 
equation (3.7) and (3.74) into equation (3.33).  
  RFbQkRaF C
CIPC  224   
(3.81) 
The producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.82), is obtained by substituting equation 
(3.81) and IPQ  into equation (3.34). Producer surplus of IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.6a by 
area [ CF4 , α , B, C], capturing the entire price premium. 
       IPCIPIPIPC RQPSQQbRkaQPS  2
2
4
2


  
(3.82) 
As seen in scenario two, the introduction of the production constraint can positively 
impact farmer welfare by allowing farmers to extract rents by the system. The inclusion of the 
market development activities allow for the rents available to farmers to increase. The change in 
producer surplus of IP grain from scenario one to scenario four, equation (3.83), is obtained by 
substituting equation (3.29) and (3.82) into equation (3.35). 
IPCIPCC RQQQQPS 





 4,14,14,1
2

   
(3.83) 
The overall impact of the policies on farmer welfare is dependent on the degree of 
reduction in quantity, similar to the observation in scenario two. Any reduction in quantity 
greater than the critical value will result in a decrease to producer surplus of IP grain. The critical 
change in quantity, equation (3.84), is obtained by equating the partial derivative of equation 
(3.83), with respect to CQ 4,1 , to zero and solving for 
CQ 4,1 . 
   
 











b
R
critQ
b
RbQ
critQ C
C
C
22
2,1
1
4,1   
(3.84) 
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The critical change in quantity is increases from the value discovered in scenario two as a 
result of the market development activities. This is seen by comparing equation (3.45) to equation 
(3.84). The introduction of market development activities in a competitive seed ownership 
structure allows for a greater constraint in production when market development activities are 
introduced, with producer surplus of IP grain remaining indifferent between scenario four and 
scenario one.
14
 
3.4.3 Scenario 4: Oligopolistic Seed Ownership Structure 
The oligopoly case allows the impact of seed industry market power on farmer welfare to 
be calculated for an IPPM system that has constrained production and market development 
activities. The price of IP seed decreases as a result of the introduction of a constrained quantity 
and increases as a result of the premium from market development activities. The price of IP 
seed, equation (3.85), is obtained by substituting equation (3.7) and (3.76) into equation (3.23). 
     RSkQbRkaS OIPO   24   (3.85) 
The seed industry rents, equation (3.86), are obtained by substituting equation (3.85) and 
IPQ  into equation (3.10). Seed industry rents are illustrated in Figure 3.6b by area                  
[ OS4 , 
CS4 , Z, X].  
     IPoIPIPo RQQbRkaQ   24   (3.86) 
The farmer price of IP grain, equation (3.87), is obtained by substituting equation (3.85) 
and (3.74) into equation (3.33).  
         RFQbRkabQRaF OIPIPO   124
  
(3.87) 
                                                 
14
 The CWB would constrain production to this point in order to maintain a niche market in order to maintain a 
premium. 
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The producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.88), is obtained by substituting equation 
(3.87) into equation (3.34). Producer surplus of IP grain is illustrated in Figure 3.6a by area  
[ OF4 , α, B, D]. 
           IPOIPIPIPO RQPSQQbRkaQPS   11
2
2
2
4
  
(3.88) 
The change in producer surplus of IP grain, equation (3.89), is obtained by substituting 
equation (3.29) and (3.88) into equation (3.35).  
            IPIPOOOO QbRkaQQQQPS   1
2
4,11
2
4,14,1  
(3.89) 
The redistribution of rents from the production constraint and market development 
activities is dependent on the degree of market power possessed by the seed industry. The 
production constraint prevents a change in welfare for consumers, leaving the market 
development activities able to improve the welfare of farmers and the seed industry. If market 
power of the seed industry is lower than a certain value producer surplus of IP grain will 
decrease, as seen in scenario two. This critical value for market power, equation (3.90), is 
obtained by equating the partial derivative of equation (3.89), with respect to δ to zero, and then 
solving for δ. 
 
 
  






 

2
1
44
4,1
2
12
C
IPMC
Q
QFF
crit

   
(3.90) 
The critical value for market power for scenario four can be compared with that of 
scenario two, comparing equation (3.90) to equation (3.45). Given that CC FF 24   and 
MM FF 24   
one can conclude that    critcrit 2,14,1   . The introduction of market development activities 
allows producer surplus to remain unchanged when a stricter production constraint is imposed 
when the seed industry has a low degree of market power (i.e. perfectly competitive, or a 
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competitive oligopoly). This result echoes that found in the perfectly competitive case when 
examining the critical change in quantity from scenario one to scenario four.  
3.4.4 Production Constraints and Market Development Activities: Summary  
Scenario four demonstrates the interaction of market development activities and a 
production constraint. The analysis demonstrates the influence of the policies on the producer 
surplus of IP grain. The production constraint creates a stronger tie between the distribution of 
the benefit from market development activities and market power as demonstrated in equation 
(3.88). The market development activities allow for a greater reduction in quantity before the 
change in producer surplus of IP grain is equal to the base case ( 04,1 
CPS ), as demonstrated in 
equation (3.84). This in turn is influenced by the degree of market power held by the seed 
industry, where the introduction of market development activities decreases the critical market 
power, as demonstrated in equation (3.90).  
The impact of the market development activities on producer surplus of IP grain is 
inversely related to the degree of market power of the seed industry, with it having no positive 
impact when faced with a monopolistic seed industry. An IPPM system in the presence of a seed 
industry with a large degree of market power will result in the benefit generated from market 
development activities to primarily increase seed company rents, leaving little for farmers. 
3.5 Summary of Theoretical Model 
The four scenarios discussed in this chapter outline the impact of an IPPM system‟s 
policies on farmer welfare. The two examples of an IPPM system, constrained production 
(scenario two) and constrained production in the presence of market development activities 
(scenario four), demonstrate the influence of market power on rent distribution. The monopolistic 
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and oligopolistic seed ownership structures provide insight into actual seed variety ownership and 
the impact of the creation and development of an IPPM system on farmer welfare. 
The development of an IPPM system and the implementation of the two policies 
examined in this chapter can provide a variety of changes to farmer welfare depending on market 
power and of their introduction separately or jointly. Constrained production was shown to 
increase farmer welfare from an unconstrained market provided the constrained quantity was 
greater than equation (3.45). The market development activities was shown in the unconstrained 
case to positively impact farmer welfare, consumer welfare, as well as seed company profits 
(equation (3.73), (3.71) and (3.69), respectively). The combined policies were shown to have 
similar impact as to the individual policies but lessened the impact of the farmer premium when 
production was constrained. It is shown that a large degree of market power by the seed industry 
results in diminished impact of the benefit of market development activities to farmers. As a 
result of these findings it can be concluded that the development of an IPPM system and its 
policies are dependent on the degree of market power held by seed companies over varieties. If 
seed company market power is high, the introduction of a constrained production is beneficial, 
yet provides little incentive for the market to be developed in order to provide a higher premium 
to increase farmer welfare. 
In chapter four we examine an empirical analysis of two IPCP varieties that are involved 
in an IPPM system as illustrated in scenario four, constrained production with market 
development activities. The empirical analysis demonstrates the correlation of extraction of 
premium elicited from market development activities and market power. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN WHEAT BOARD‟S IDENTITY 
PRESERVED CONTRACT PROGRAM 
4 Empirical Analysis 
It is hypothesized that the seed industry is exerting market power on farmers involved in 
the Canadian Wheat Board‟s (CWB) Identity Preserved Contract Program (IPCP). The impact of 
the exertion of market power by the seed industry on IPPM systems is presented in the four 
scenarios of the theoretical model, with scenario two and four representing the IPCP. The 
empirical analysis provides a tool to detect and quantify the exertion of market power by the seed 
industry on farmers, measuring the re-distribution of rents and the total rents captured by the seed 
company.  
This chapter begins by describing the CWB‟s IPCP; outlining farmer‟s contract structure, 
the environment the IPCP operates in, and the factors affecting its development. The empirical 
analysis follows, examining two IPCP wheat varieties; AC Navigator and Snowbird. Identity 
Preserved Contract Program varieties are compared with conventional non-IPCP varieties to 
determine an average relative benefit to farmers involved in the program. The average relative 
benefit provides a tool for the detection of the exertion of market power by seed companies and 
measures the total re-distribution of IPCP premiums from farmers to seed companies. It is 
theorized that the exertion of market power can be detected if a farmer‟s benefit of producing an 
IPCP variety would be equal to or less than that of a non-IPCP variety. The chapter concludes 
explaining the limitations of the empirical analysis. 
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4.1 Canadian Wheat Board’s Identity Preservation Program 
The CWB‟s first step towards a national IPPM system was in 1998 and was called the 
Market Development Contract Program (MDCP) (Hilderman 2009). The initial goal of the 
program was to match production to the market in order to re-establish and maintain the 
reputation of Western Canada for producing high quality wheat, durum, and barley. The MDCP 
showcased the ability of Canadian farmers to produce high quality grain, as well as 
demonstrating the ability of Canadian plant breeders to produce new and high valued varieties. 
Varieties included in the program contained valuable properties demanded by consumers, but are 
not easily distinguished from conventional varieties (CWB 2004a). As the program progressed it 
was renamed the Identity Preserved Contract Program to better reflect its added focus on the 
development of an IP system for the CWB (CWB 2004a).  
The IPCP consists of two individual core activities; the market development IPCP, the 
commercial IPCP (CWB 2004a). The market development IPCP focuses on testing the niche 
market potential of new high quality varieties that contain unique characteristics in domestic and 
international markets. The commercial IPCP focuses on market penetration of Canadian varieties 
into already established niche markets to increase market share. The CWB assumed that 
accurately meeting a market‟s preferences allows for more value to be extracted from the market. 
The goal of the IPCP is to meet the objectives of the core activities in a manner that transfers the 
maximum amount of value generated by the program back to farmers.  
Initially the IPCP covered Canada Western Amber Durum (CWAD), Canadian Prairie 
Spring Red wheat (CPSR), and Canadian Prairie Spring White wheat (CPSW) varieties. 
However, the program has grown where in the 2006-07 crop year, the program consisted of 14 
varieties including the CWAD variety AC Navigator and the new wheat class Canada Western 
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Hard White Spring wheat (CWHWS) (CWB 2005c). The varieties selected for the program 
represented significant breeding advancements of varieties that possessed unique traits that had 
niche market potential. Varieties remained in the program as long as are viable; some varieties 
only lasting a single season whereas others lasting for over a decade. 
One of the objectives of the IPCP is to organize the agricultural supply chain to handle IP 
systems for wheat and barley. Important to the system is providing sufficient incentives for 
participation in all sectors of the supply chain, with farmers being of special importance to the 
CWB. Exertion of market power by any of the participants within the IPCP has the potential to 
re-distribute the incentives provided by the IPCP and could result in the system‟s failure. 
4.1.1 Farmer Activities and Incentives 
Farmer participation in an IPPM system producing a stable supply of high quality grain is 
the basis of an IPPM system‟s success. Farmer adoption of IPCP varieties and their participation 
in the IPCP requires sufficient incentives to overcome the real and perceived difficulties of 
involvement in the program (Maltsbarger and Kalaitzandonakes 2000). An adequate production 
base is critical for the success of a branded IP system as supply interruptions can prove to be 
detrimental to consumer confidence and its continued success (Janzen and Wilson 2002). 
An objective of the IPCP, as previously stated, is to transfer the maximum amount of 
value generated from the system back to farmers. This assists in raising farmer confidence in the 
program and thereby promotes the maintenance of an adequate production base. The CWB 
provides a variety of cash and non-cash incentives to meet this objective, such as; guaranteed 
acceptance, on-farm storage premiums, protein premiums, and a delivery premium (CWB 
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2004b).
15
 Guaranteed acceptance removes marketing risk of producing niche market grains. The 
escalating on-farm storage premium reduces the threat of losses associated with decreasing grain 
quality associated with on-farm storage. The escalating on-farm storage premium varies within 
the program depending on the IPCP variety, the premium ranges from $0.03 to $0.05/tonne per 
day (CWB 2004b). The escalating on-farm storage premium also functions as a logistical tool for 
alignment, and optimal use, of transportation and storage assets. Premiums directly tied to quality 
and quantity are included in the IPCP, which fluctuate year to year in accordance to the market 
(CWB 2004a, 2005c). The combination of premiums can potentially provide farmers a benefit of 
$14/acre, taking into account the additional costs of involvement (CWB 2005a).
16
  
Production and marketing contracts establish the incentive for farmer participation in the 
IPCP as well as for agricultural input companies. These contracts create a framework for 
participation in a closed loop system for the production of specific varieties at specific grades and 
protein levels. The contracts and system are not stagnant but change and evolve over time to deal 
with problems that arise within the system. In addition to creating incentives for participation, the 
contract structure of the IPCP establishes the distribution of market power and relationships 
between participants. 
4.1.2 Market Power and Failures of the Identity Preserved Contract Program 
The IPCP‟s policies and alignment of supply chain activities develop and change as new 
problems arise within the system. The program has experienced growing pains in the first few 
years of operation in terms of inefficiencies and handling failures (Rosher 2004). These problems 
have been addressed through participant education and streamlining of activities in order to 
                                                 
15
 These incentives are not included for all IPCP varieties. 
16
 The recipient of the CWB‟s 2005 Master Grower award for Canada Western Red Winter Select wheat reported the 
$14/acre benefit. 
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minimize future losses. Identity preserved production and marketing systems have two major 
areas of concern; the first is to maintain product purity, the second to maintain an adequate 
supply to allow the program to succeed. 
Maintenance of product purity in the IPCP has had difficulties. The IPCP has a 95% 
variety purity requirement, which provides an adequate purity level for consumer products while 
minimizing costs. Problems with meeting purity requirements occurred during the early years of 
the IPCP. As the program grew, and participants became experienced operating within an IPPM 
system, problems associated with the IPPM system were able to be addressed and diminished 
(Rosher 2004). These problems were a result of contamination during handling, storage and 
transportation, and from seed purity issues.  
The difficulties with product segregation were a result of poor record keeping by firms in 
the supply chain. The poor record keeping allowed grain to be mislabelled and pooled with 
conventional varieties (Rosher 2004). In these cases, the IP system allowed for the discovery of 
where in the supply chain the failure occurred, allowing the cause of the failure to be addressed 
and corrected to prevent future failures (Rosher 2004). 
Identity preserved production and marketing systems manage seed purity using acceptable 
seed; certified seed, verified seed. Certified seed provides a guarantee, by a seed merchant, of the 
purity of the seed. The guarantee provides farmers with a liability mitigation tool if the seed is 
found to be substandard (Canadian Seed Trade Association 2003). The alternative of certified 
seed is a type of farmer saved seed called verified seed. Verified seed is grain produced using 
certified seed in a previous year, and then used as seed in a subsequent year (Canadian Grain 
Commission 1998). The authenticity of verified seed is supported by certified seed tags or 
invoices and possibly testing to prove purity. Farmer saved seed does not have the same 
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guarantees of purity, and can present an opportunity for contamination at the field level if proper 
agronomic practices are not followed (Cooper 1984). 
In the beginning of the IPCP, farmers had the option of using saved seed for subsequent 
year‟s production. This policy made the IPCP more in line with conventional farming practices 
where farmers did not purchase certified seed every year allowing farmers to spread the cost of 
certified seed over a number of years. The use of saved seed allowed the program to be more 
economically viable to a larger production base. The use of saved seed proved an obstacle for the 
IPCP with the use of substandard saved seed. This created purity issues resulting in the program 
failing to meet market purity requirements (Rosher 2004). As a result, stricter seed requirements 
were introduced. Resulting in certified seed being required for the first three years a variety was 
involved in the program (CWB 2005b). Saved seed was still allowed within the program, but is 
required to meet acceptable purity levels in subsequent years. Arguments have been made for and 
against the use of saved seed within an IPPM system. Saved seed has been argued to be of lower 
quality and creates an opportunity for contamination (Cooper 1984; Edwards and Krenzer 2006). 
It has also been argued that with the use of proper agronomic practices the purity of saved seed 
can be equal to that of certified seed (Edwards and Krenzer 2006). Even though saved seed is 
allowed within the program, the CWB maintains the right to impose pedigreed (certified) seed 
requirements on a case by case basis (CWB 2005b). 
Farmers involved in the IPCP are allowed by the CWB to use saved seed, but are not 
allowed to use saved seed because of the IPCP‟s contract structure. As previously stated, farmers 
are involved in a marketing contract with the IPCP, as well as a production contract with 
agricultural input companies. The production contract requires the use of certified seed, which 
results in the IPCP requiring certified seed, thus allowing the seed input companies to exert 
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market power over the system. The requirement of certified seed can pose a deterrent to farmers 
if the premium offered by the program is insufficient to offset the additional seed cost. Other 
obstacles are also present within the system such as delivery contracts tied to a single elevator, 
preventing farmers from shopping their grain around to obtain a higher grade.  
4.1.3 Summary of the IPCP 
The IPCP was developed to create an IP system for Western Canadian wheat and barley 
farmers. The contract structure of the IPCP governs the interactions and relationships between 
participants. The contractual requirements have been changed and adjusted over time to deal with 
failures in the system. The changes in the contracts between farmers and seed companies have 
shifted more bargaining (market) power to the hands of the seed companies. An empirical 
analysis follows to detect if the seed companies are exerting market power over farmers involved 
in the IPCP, and extracting the majority of the rents. 
4.2 Empirical Analysis Cases 
Farmer participation in the CWB‟s IPCP is dependent upon the rents made available to 
them through the IPPM system (Janzen and Wilson 2002). Rent distribution is dependent on the 
relative bargaining power between participants. Farmers negotiate with the marketer for the price 
of grain, as well with input suppliers for the price of seed. The marketer (CWB) is assumed to 
exert no bargaining power over farmers, and is assumed to provide farmers with the highest price 
possible for their wheat. Additionally the CWB is assumed to return all revenues from the system 
to farmers, minus the cost of marketing. Negotiations between the input supplier and farmer have 
an unknown outcome and are the subject of this empirical analysis. The distribution of rents 
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between farmer and input supplier will be measured, as well as the entire rents and premiums 
made available to farmers in the system. 
The empirical analysis examines two cases of IPCP varieties AC Navigator, a CWAD 
variety, and Snowbird, a CWHWS variety. These two varieties, AC Navigator and Snowbird, are 
involved in the Commercial IPCP and have been included since 2000 and 2003, respectively. 
Markets for AC Navigator and Snowbird are assumed to be well established, as is a developed 
production base to supply the market. Participants are assumed to have full understanding of the 
markets/programs costs and revenues allowing participants to price their activities/products in a 
manner that is perfectly aligned with their relative market power.  
The analysis examines the profitability of involvement in the IPCP for a Saskatchewan 
farmer that receives average yields and price of grain (henceforth referred to as a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer) in the Brown, Dark Brown, Black, and Grey soil zones (represented by 
areas one, two, three and four in Figure 4.1, respectively). Production practices for IPCP and non-
IPCP varieties were assumed to be identical; inputs, agronomic practices, quality of land, and 
environmental factors such as sunlight, temperature, and moisture. Crop yield data was obtained 
from the Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization (SAFRR) Crop Planning 
Guide (SAFRR 2006a).
17
 Yield and protein were adjusted to represent the genetic potential of the 
varieties, which was obtained from the SAFRR Variety of Grain Crops (SAFRR 2006b). Prices 
were taken as the final payment made by the CWB for No. 1 wheat, at the varieties relative 
protein level. Certified seed prices were obtained through a telephone survey and industry data 
(Duvenaud 2006). Seed prices were unavailable for Snowbird and CWRS varieties over the 
period of the study, as such the seed variable expenses from the SAFRR Variety of Grain Crops 
                                                 
17
 Saskatchewan Agriculture Food and Rural Revitalization name was changed in 2005 to Saskatchewan Agriculture 
and Food, and further changed in 2007 to Saskatchewan Ministry of Agriculture. 
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were used (SAFRR 2006b, 2007b, 2008b). Actual price of seed for Snowbird and CWRS 
varieties were not critical to the study as Snowbird is typically priced at a $4/bu premium over 
conventional CWRS varieties (Alderson 2009). Seeding rates were obtained from the SAFRR 
Crop Planning Guide (2006a). 
The two cases chosen for the empirical analysis provide a comparison between different 
seed ownership structures and the impact of fluctuations in price and yield on farmer profitability. 
The first case, AC Navigator, examines the IPCP variety against two comparable non-IPCP 
varieties that have different ownership structures (monopoly and oligopoly). The second case, 
Snowbird, examines the IPCP variety against a weighted average of Canadian Western Red 
Spring (CWRS) varieties over a three-year period to determine the impact of fluctuations in yield 
and price on farmer opportunity cost. 
The difference in the price of seed between an IPCP variety and that of conventional 
varieties can be assumed to be relative to the capturable benefit of the IPCP variety over the 
conventional. The price of seed for a variety is assumed to be based on its production 
characteristics that relate to its agronomic performance in regards to yield, protein level, and 
resistance to biotic and abiotic stresses. The ownership structure can be assumed to influence 
price by allowing the seed company to capture a relative portion of the benefit from the 
production characteristics of each variety. In the case of the IPCP, the premiums offered by the 
program provide another benefit that can be captured by the seed industry.  
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Figure 4.1: Overlay of Saskatchewan Crop Districts and Soil Zones 
 
The hypothesis tested in this chapter is that seed companies are exerting market power 
within the IPCP and extracting the majority of the rents. Each case describes the IPCP variety, 
the varieties market potential, and the market‟s consumers and competitors. An empirical 
analysis follows comparing the IPCP variety to a non-IPCP variety, which is representative of its 
class. A per acre revenue is calculated for both the IPCP and non-IPCP varieties and compared to 
determine the opportunity cost of involvement with the program for a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer in each of the three soil zones. 
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Empirical Analysis Assumptions: 
 Markets for AC Navigator and Snowbird are well established 
 Participants have a full understanding of costs and revenues for participating in the IPCP 
 Profitability of IPCP is based on a representative Saskatchewan farmer in each soil zone 
 Production practices of IPCP and non-IPCP varieties are identical 
 Pricing of seed is based on measurable agronomic traits: yield, protein content, and 
variety premiums 
4.2.1 Case 1: AC Navigator 
AC Navigator is a CWAD variety preferred by consumers for its strong yellow 
pigmentation and high gluten strength. In 1997, AC Navigator had a limited release, with 
production beginning in 1999 (Dexter 2008). This variety possesses a gluten strength double that 
of conventional varieties at the time, and was the first attempt in the creation of a new class of 
wheat, extra strong durum. AC Navigator failed to meet the envisioned requirements of the new 
extra strong durum class, and subsequently reclassified as CWAD.
18
 The variety is licensed by 
Viterra, an agri-product company, which is vertically integrated into the supply chain engaging in 
wheat breeding efforts, transportation, shipping, value added processing, and marketing (Viterra 
2009). The variety was developed in a joint effort between the Western Grains Research 
Foundation (WGRF) and the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (which later merged with Agricore 
United in 2007, the new entity was later named Viterra). 
                                                 
18
 Since AC Navigators introduction in 1997 newer varieties have been introduced with much higher gluten strength 
meeting the requirements of the Extra Strong Durum class such as Commander (94% gluten index to AC Navigators 
74%) resulting in its reclassification as a CWAD. 
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The introduction of AC Navigator demonstrated that the gluten strength of CWAD 
varieties could be increased dramatically. Initial market reaction to higher gluten strength in the 
CWAD class was unknown, prompting regulators to give the variety a limited release and to 
require the creation of an IP system for AC Navigator (Dexter et al. 2007). This variety was 
unique to the IPCP as there was symmetric risk between AC Navigator and the general CWAD 
commodity (Smyth and Phillips 2003). In 2003, AC Navigator was recommended for full release 
and as of 2005 was granted full registration, allowing it to be blended with other CWAD varieties 
(DePauw et al. 2003; Dexter 2008).  
Market demand for AC Navigator is driven by niche premium pasta markets because of 
its bright yellow colour (DePauw et al. 2003, Dexter et al. 2007). Processors prefer AC 
Navigator for its higher semolina yield, allowing for higher extraction rates (Dexter 2008). 
Markets demanding AC Navigator are predominantly in the United States, Italy, and South 
America (DePauw et al. 2003, Dexter et al. 2007). AC Navigator is typically blended with lower 
quality durums to produce a blended product with a stronger yellow pigment and higher gluten 
strength. AC Navigator competes with a number of varieties for market share; Southwestern 
American desert durums, and similar Australian varieties (DePauw et al. 2003).  
AC Navigator is a unique IPCP variety in that production of the variety occurs both inside 
and outside of the IPCP. Total production of AC Navigator in 2006 accounted for less than 10% 
of all CWAD produced in Canada, of which 60% marketed through the IPCP. Viterra controls 
the distribution of AC Navigator IPCP contracts, which is restricted to their “AC Navigator Loyal 
Growers” program. Farmers who are not members of the “AC Navigator Loyal Growers” are able 
to obtain non-IPCP AC Navigator production contracts through Viterra (Viterra 2008). Non-IPCP 
AC Navigator farmers are able to take advantage of series A delivery contracts, but still require 
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full delivery to Viterra. The non-IPCP production receives regular operations premium, which is 
less than the IPCP delivery contract $2.00/tonne premium.
19
 Production outside of the IPCP 
demonstrates that farmers are able to compensate for the increase in seed cost and the absence of 
the $4.50/tonne premiums associated with the IPCP. Assuming that farmers are rational profit 
maximizers, it can be reasonably assumed that they are able to achieve returns that are equal to or 
greater than that of other durum varieties.  
The AC Navigator IPCP is placed into context by first examining the major areas of 
production. This is followed by a measurement of the total layout by the CWB and Viterra for the 
AC Navigator IPCP. Knowing the total rents made available to farmers, measurements could 
then be undertaken to determine what proportion of these rents a representative Saskatchewan 
farmer could capture. The expected costs and revenues for AC Navigator, AC Avonlea and Kyle 
are calculated to estimate the revenue on a $/bu basis of the three varieties. Expected yields in 
bu/acre are then calculated, followed by an estimation of the relative profitability of AC 
Navigator to AC Avonlea and Kyle in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones. Knowing the 
relative profitability of the three varieties distribution of AC Navigator was then estimated within 
Saskatchewan to determine the relative weighted average benefit to Saskatchewan farmers in 
terms of $/acre. 
Production of Canadian durum is primarily in Saskatchewan, with few acres in Alberta, 
Manitoba and British Columbia. Saskatchewan accounts for over 80% of AC Navigator 
production, with Alberta producing the remainder (Table 4.1). On average 60% of AC Navigator 
is produced under contract for the IPCP, with the remainder under contract with Viterra. 
Estimation of AC Navigator production was calculated by cross referencing the percentage of 
                                                 
19
 The regular operations premium is variable depending on the point of delivery. 
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CWAD acres seeded to AC Navigator in each prairie province (CWB 2006b) with the number of 
seeded acres of CWAD in each prairie province (Statistics Canada, Various Years).  
Table 4.1: AC Navigator Production Distribution and Contracted Acres in Western Canada 
 AC Navigator Production (Acres)
i
 CWB Contracted 
Acres
ii
 
Total Prairie 
CWAD Acres  Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta Total 
2008 0 433,500  110,670  544,170  325,000  5,970,000 
2007 0 449,550  84,915  534,465  300,000  4,760,000 
2006 0 380,504  43,949  424,453  260,000  3,750,000 
2005 0 463,200  68,800  532,000  335,000  5,630,000 
i
 Source: Authors calculation utilizing Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 001-0017 and CWB 
Variety Survey 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 
ii
 Source: Rosher 2009 
 
Production of CWAD varies from year to year while the composition of varieties shifts 
from year to year towards newer higher yielding varieties. AC Navigator makes up a relatively 
small proportion of all seeded acres of CWAD in Western Canada. AC Navigator is compared to 
non-IPCP varieties AC Avonlea and Kyle. AC Avonlea has similar yield characteristics as AC 
Navigator; as well, it was introduced in the same year. Kyle is an established variety that has 
been falling out of favour to newer higher yielding varieties such as AC Avonlea and Strongfield. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the change in seeded acres of different CWAD varieties across the prairies 
from 2000 to 2009. 
The AC Navigator IPCP offers farmers a delivery premium of $2.50/tonne in addition to a 
$2.00/acre production premium offered by Viterra (Churko 2009). The IPCP operates through a 
contract that specifies the number of acres seeded to AC Navigator, and grants a premium based 
on yield (tonnage). In order to estimate the total premium outlay, average CWAD yields were 
applied to the AC Navigator acreage. The total outlay for AC Navigator by the CWB and Viterra 
is estimated in Table 4.2, accounting for 2.24 million acres and $8.8 million in premiums over the 
past decade.  
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Figure 4.2: Prairie Average Seeded Acres of CWAD Varieties 
 
Table 4.2: AC Navigator Contracted Acres and Farmer Premiums 
 Contracts
i
 
Delivery 
Premium
ii
 
Production 
Premium
iii
 
CWAD Average 
Yield
iv
 
Total 
Premium 
Year (Acres) ($/Tonne) ($/Tonne) Tonne/Acre $ 
2001 52,000  2.50  2.00  0.60  411,401  
2002 184,000  2.50  2.00  0.70  579,143  
2003 155,000  2.50  2.00  0.71  497,350  
2004 276,000  2.50  2.00  0.95  1,176,308  
2005 335,000  2.50  2.00  1.05  1,583,654  
2006 260,000  2.50  2.00  0.89  1,044,439  
2007 300,000  2.50  2.00  0.77  1,043,431  
2008 325,000  2.50  2.00  0.93  1,353,290  
2009 250,000  2.50  2.00  1.00  1,125,000  
Total 2,237,000      8,814,015 
i
 Source: Rosher 2009 
ii
 Source: CWB 2004a, 2005c, 2006a, 2008a 
                The premium was assumed to be $2.50/tonne for missing years. 
iii
 Source: Churko 2009 
iv
 Source: Authors calculation using Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 001-0010 and 001-0017 (2009 
estimated at 1.00 tonne/acre) 
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The return from agricultural crop production is dependent on the cost of inputs, crop 
yield, grain quality, and the price of grain. Crop production data, seeding rate and yield, were 
taken from the SAFRR Crop Planning Guide (2006a). Crop price was taken as the CWB final 
payments for No. 1 wheat in the 2006-07 crop year at the variety‟s relative protein level outlined 
in the SAFRR Varieties of Grain Crops (SAFRR 2006b). The CWB lists the price of AC 
Navigator CWAD separately from the CWAD class. The price of AC Navigator and the CWAD 
class are often identical but have occasionally diverged for specific protein levels in specific 
years. Seed prices were obtained through a seed grower survey in the summer of 2006. Durum 
production was examined in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones of Saskatchewan, under the 
assumption that similar production practices are conducted for all varieties in each soil zone. The 
variables affecting the relative profit are; cost of seed, cost of segregation, price based on relative 
protein level, relative yield, and production and delivery premiums. 
The seeding cost for the three varieties is calculated in Table 4.3. The cost of certified 
seed was found to be $9.50/bu for AC Navigator, $7.21/bu for AC Avonlea, and $6.11/bu Kyle 
(Duvenaud 2006). A seeding rate of 1.5 bu/acre was used as well assuming the same seeding rate 
in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones. Cost of seeding for AC Navigator was calculated to be 
$14.25/acre, with AC Avonlea at $10.81/acre, and Kyle at $9.16/acre.  
Table 4.3: Seeding Cost for CWAD Varieties in 2006 
 AC Navigator AC Avonlea Kyle 
Seed Price ($/bu) 9.50 7.21 6.11 
Seeding Rate (bu/acre) 
i
 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Seed Cost ($/acre) 14.25 10.81 9.16 
i
 Seeding rate was assumed to be constant at 1.5 bu/acre for all varieties across all soil zones 
Source: Duvenaud 2006 
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The crop price and net price for CWAD varieties are calculated in Table 4.4. The net 
price is taken as the price of the crop plus the premiums offered by the IPCP for that variety, less 
the cost of segregation for that variety. Crop price is determined by the relative protein levels of 
the varieties and were taken as 13.7, 14.2, and 13.9 for AC Navigator, AC Avonlea and Kyle, 
respectively (SAFRR 2006b). The crop price for AC Navigator was determined to be $6.22/bu, 
AC Avonlea at $6.28/bu, and Kyle at $6.25/bu (CWB 2006c). The premium offered by CWB for 
AC Navigator in 2006-07 totalled $4.50/tonne or $0.122/bu, composed of a $2.50/tonne delivery 
contract premium and a $2.00/tonne production contract premium. The cost of segregation was 
taken as $1.04/tonne, or $0.03/bu (Huygen et al. 2004). This resulted in a net price of $6.31/bu 
for AC Navigator, $6.28/bu for AC Avonlea, and $6.25/bu for Kyle. 
Table 4.4: Price of Grain, Segregation Cost and Net Price of CWAD Varieties in 2006 
 AC Navigator AC Avonlea Kyle 
Protein Content (%) 
i
 13.7 14.2 13.9 
Crop Price ($/bu)
 ii
 6.22 6.28 6.25 
Production and Delivery Premium ($/bu)
 iii
 0.12 0 0 
Gross Price ($/bu) 6.34 6.28 6.25 
Segregation Cost ($/bu)
 iv
 0.03 0 0 
Net Price ($/bu) 6.31 6.28 6.25 
i  
 Source: SAFRR Varieties of Grain Crops 2006, 2007, 2008
 
ii
  Source: CWB 2006c 
iii
 Source: CWB 2006a and Churko 2009
 
iv
 Source: Huygen et al. 2004 
 
The yields of AC Navigator, AC Avonlea and Kyle are outlined in Table 4.5. The average 
CWAD yields in 2006 were 35.1 bu/acre in the Brown soil zone, and 36.2 bu/acre in the Dark 
Brown soil zone (SAFRR 2006b). Yield indices for the Brown and Dark Brown soil zone for AC 
Navigator and AC Avonlea were identical (106%) and greater than that of Kyle (100%) (SAFRR 
2006b).  
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Table 4.5: Estimated Yield of CWAD Varieties in 2006 
 AC Navigator AC Avonlea Kyle 
Brown Soil Zone (35.1 bu/acre)
i
    
Relative Yield (%)
ii
 106 106 100 
Estimated Yield (bu/acre) 37.21 37.21 35.1 
Dark Brown Soil Zone (36.2 bu/acre)
i
    
Relative Yield (%)
ii
 106 106 100 
Estimated Yield (bu/acre) 38.37 38.37 36.2 
i
 Source: SAFRR 2006b 
ii
 Source: SAFRR 2006a 
 
The revenue less seed cost (RLSC) of AC Navigator, AC Avonlea and Kyle in the Brown 
and Dark Brown soil zones in the 2006/07 crop year are displayed in Table 4.6. Revenue less 
seed cost is calculated as the yield from one acre multiplied by the calculated net price for each 
variety. The RLSC of AC Navigator is then compared to that of AC Avonlea and Kyle in $/acre 
and as percent advantage (disadvantage) of the non-IPCP variety. In the 2006-07 crop year, the 
RLSC of AC Avonlea compared to AC Navigator was $2.14 and $2.13/acre higher in the Brown 
and Dark Brown soil zones, respectively. The RLSC of Kyle compared to AC Navigator was 
found to be $10.49 and $10.94/acre lower in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones, respectively. 
Differences in RLSC between AC Navigator and AC Avonlea are based on the difference in cost 
of certified seed, relative protein content, and IPCP crop premium. Of the three varieties, Kyle 
yielded on average 5% less, which accounts for its lower profitability. 
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Table 4.6: Calculated Revenue and Benefit of AC Navigator Durum Production vs. 
Competing Varieties in 2006 
 AC Navigator AC Avonlea Kyle 
Soil Zone  
Brown 
Dark 
Brown 
Brown 
Dark 
Brown 
Brown 
Dark 
Brown 
Net Price ($/bu)
i
 6.31 6.31 6.28 6.28 6.25 6.25 
Estimated Yield (bu/acre)
ii
 37.21 38.37 37.21 38.37 35.10 36.20 
Revenue ($/acre) 234.95 242.27 235.65 240.98 219.38 226.25 
Cost of Seeding ($/acre)
iii
 14.25 14.25 10.81 10.81 9.16 9.16 
Revenue Less Seed Cost ($/acre) 220.70 228.03 222.84 230.16 210.21 217.09 
  vs. AC Navigator ($/acre)
iv
   2.14 2.13 -10.49 -10.94 
  vs. AC Navigator (%)
iv
   1% 1% -5% -5% 
i
 Net price is the average price for the wheat variety plus production and delivery premiums less the cost 
of segregation. 
ii
 Estimated yield is the average yield for the soil zone multiplied by the varieties yield index. 
iii
 Cost of seeding is at reported prices by Duvenaud (2006) at a seeding rate of 1.5 bu/acre. 
iv
 This is the comparison of the RLSC of AC Avonlea and Kyle less the RLSC of AC Navigator. 
Source: SAFRR Crop Planning Guide 2006 
 
Three factors affect the RLSC of AC Navigator compared to AC Avonlea; seed cost, 
relative protein, and relative yield. Protein content and yield are variables dependent on 
environmental conditions and production inputs. The assumption of similar growing conditions 
makes their impact on relative profitability moot. A difference in initial seed price is the only 
variable that can change between the two varieties. Comparing the RLSC between AC Navigator 
and AC Avonlea shows that if the price of AC Navigator seed were decreased by $1.42/bu (or 
$1.43/bu for the Dark Brown soil zone) the RLSC would be equal.
20
 Since the same seed 
company markets these two varieties, it can be assumed that the higher cost of AC Navigator is 
not related to its agronomic traits but to the premium offered by the IPCP program. It can also be 
assumed that the price premium for AC Navigator seed relates to the other benefits offered to 
farmers for participation in the IPCP, such as guaranteed acceptance and the escalating storage 
premium. 
                                                 
20
 The difference in the higher cost of seed due to the seed price premium for AC Navigator between the Brown and 
Dark Brown soil zones on a per bushel of output is due to the higher yield in the dark brown soil zone. The higher 
price of seed is calculated by comparing the revenue less seed cost between AC Navigator and AC Avonlea and 
dividing by the seeding rate. 
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The profitability of producing AC Navigator is impacted directly by yield, which can vary 
quite dramatically depending on the year and soil zone. In order to determine the profitability of 
producing AC Navigator, the distribution of AC Navigator production within Saskatchewan is 
required to be calculated. Distribution of AC Navigator production was calculated using the 
CWB Variety Survey (2007 and 2008) and SAFRR Saskatchewan Crop District Crop Production 
(2007 and 2008). Crop district data was used to estimate CWAD acreage in each crop production 
zone. Due to crop districts and crop production zones not sharing common borders, crop districts 
were visually assigned to a crop production zone based on an overlay of crop production zones in 
crop districts (see Figure 4.1). Crop districts were assigned to crop production zones based on 
geographic dominance. In Figure 4.1 the crop production zones are represented by the different 
shades of grey and white numbers in black circles, with crop districts represented by thick black 
lines and text. 
From Figure 4.1, it is estimated that two thirds of Saskatchewan AC Navigator production 
occurs in crop production zone one, with crop production zone two making up the last third 
(Table 4.7).
21
 It is estimated that production of AC Navigator in Saskatchewan accounted for 
432,000 acres in 2007, and 430,906 acres in 2008 (Rosher 2009). Production of AC Navigator 
remained relatively constant in Saskatchewan even though durum acreage has increased between 
2007 and 2008. This resulted in the acreage proportion of AC Navigator decreasing from 10.9% 
in 2007 to 8.7% in 2008. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Trace amounts of AC Navigator production occurs in Black and Grey soil zones. 
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Table 4.7: Distribution of AC Navigator Production (% and Acres) in Saskatchewan 
 2008 2007 Average 
Soil Zone % Production  Acres % Production Acres % Production Acres 
Brown 71.6% 308,432  65.2% 281,795 68.4% 295,113 
Dark Brown 28.2% 121,706  34.0% 147,046  31.1% 134,376  
Black 0.2% 768  0.8% 3,317 0.5% 2,043 
Grey 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 
Total 100 430,906 100 432,158 100 431,532 
Source: Authors calculation utilizing CWB Variety Survey for Saskatchewan 2007, 2008 and 
             SAFRR: Saskatchewan Crop District Crop Production 2007, 2008. 
 
The overall benefit of producing AC Navigator durum can be estimated based on both its 
distributional information (Table 4.7), and its relative value (Table 4.6). The distribution of AC 
Navigator in Saskatchewan could not be determined due to the absence of data for 2006, however 
it is assumed that 2007 and 2008 are representative of 2006. The average of the distribution over 
these two years is used to represent the production in 2006 (Table 4.7).
22
 The estimated 
contracted acres are the number of IPCP contracts in Saskatchewan in 2006, assuming a weighted 
distribution of IPCP contracts based on production. The distributional data combined with the 
relative profitability (Table 4.6) allow for the total relative profitability of involvement in the AC 
Navigator IPCP over that of producing the non-IPCP varieties Kyle and AC Avonlea (Table 4.8). 
The overall benefit to farmers involved in the AC Navigator IPCP compared to Kyle is estimated 
to be over $2.48 million (a 5% benefit). In contrast, the economic loss for of involvement in the 
AC Navigator IPCP compared to producing AC Avonlea is $498,789 (a 1% loss). 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The Brown and Dark Brown soil zones account for 99.53% of all AC Navigator production. The absence of Black 
soil zone production values requires the percentages to be proportionally adjusted to 100% to calculate a weighted 
average. 
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Table 4.8: Estimated Farmer Benefit of AC Navigator vs. Kyle and AC Navigator vs. AC 
Avonlea Production in 2006 
 AC Navigator vs. 
Kyle 
AC Navigator vs. 
AC Avonlea 
Brown Soil Zone   
 Relative Difference in RLSC ($/acre)
i
 10.49 -2.14 
  % of CWAD acres 69% 69% 
 Weighted Benefit $/acre 7.24 -1.48 
Dark Brown Soil Zone   
   Relative Difference in RLSC ($/acre)
i
 10.94 -2.13 
   % of CWAD acres 31% 31% 
Weighted Benefit $/acre 3.39 -0.66 
Average Weighted Benefit ($/acre) 10.63 -2.14 
Estimated Contracted Acres
ii
 233,079 233,079 
Total Benefit (Opportunity Cost) ($) 2,477,630 -498,789 
i
 Relative Difference in revenue less seed cost (RLSC) is the RLSC of AC Navigator less the 
RLSC of Kyle and AC Avonlea  
ii
 Source: Authors calculation utilizing Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 001-0017 and CWB 
Variety Survey 2006 and Rosher 2009. 
 
4.2.2 Case 2: Snowbird and Canadian Western Hard White Spring Wheat 
In 2002, a new class of wheat was introduced called Canadian Western Hard White 
Spring wheat. Initially the class consisted of two varieties Snowbird and Kanata. The varieties 
were included in the IPCP to take advantage of the marketing opportunities of hard white spring 
wheat. Of the two varieties, Snowbird was the only commercial success. Even though Kanata has 
had limited success, it was still included in the program (Hilderman 2009). Agriculture and Agri-
food Canada developed snowbird and Kanata with funding support from the WGRF. Quality 
Assured Seeds (later becoming FarmPure Genetics) license these two varieties, with the IPCP 
production contracts handled by Patterson Grain. 
Hard white wheat is virtually identical to hard red wheat in terms of production 
requirements, but has a white bran and different milling and product characteristics preferred by 
the noodle and leavened bread markets (Ransom et al. 2006). Market reaction by consumer and 
processors is favourable due to its appearance and less bitter taste. Hard white wheat allows for 
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the production of a white bread in terms of appearance and taste while maintaining the nutritional 
characteristics of whole wheat bread (Ransom et al. 2006). Asian markets prefer hard white 
wheat for high-protein noodle and bread products (Ransom et al. 2006). Processors demand for 
hard white wheat centers around the higher extrusion rates, and the lower requirement of 
additional inputs as that of hard red wheat in order to achieve a marketable whole grain product 
(Boland and Dhuyvetter 2002). 
Hard white wheat may be a new class of wheat for Canada but has an established market 
and competitors (Janzen and Wilson 2001). Markets for hard white wheat exist in a large number 
of countries including Canada, United States, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Mexico, Columbia, 
Chile, Guatemala, Caribbean, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, China, 
Philippines, Pakistan, Indonesia, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (Janzen and Wilson 
2001). Canada‟s competitors for hard white wheat are China, South-Asia, the United States, and 
Australia (Janzen and Wilson 2001). Australia is a major producer of hard white wheat producing 
a low protein hard white wheat for Asian noodle markets (Ransom et al. 2006). Asian markets, 
however, prefer high protein white wheat (Janzen and Wilson 2001). In order to meet these 
levels, Australian hard white wheat is blended with high protein red wheat to produce desirable 
protein levels. The discrepancy between Australia‟s low protein hard white wheat and the high 
protein demands of the Asian noodle markets allows their market share to be easily threatened by 
the high protein CWHWS (Ransom et al. 2006). As of 2006, only 20% of the Australian hard 
white wheat exported to Asian markets was high protein. This represents a 2 million tonne annual 
market that CWHWS can potentially capture (Worden 2006). The basis for competition in Asian 
markets is price, quality, and reliability of supply. When compared with other wheat‟s, CWHWS 
ranks among the best for the Asian instant noodle, wanton noodle, and cracker markets. It is also 
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suitable for the Asian bread and steamed bread markets (Worden 2006). The CWB‟s reputation 
for a consistent supply and high quality wheat has generated international consumer confidence 
that enhances market penetration. 
The Snowbird IPCP has fluctuated through its development, reaching a maximum of 
1,095,000 acres in 2005 and a minimum of 160,000 acres in 2009 (Hilderman 2009). Production 
of CWHWS in 2008 accounted for only 0.6% of all the wheat produced in Western Canada. This 
small production base had trouble in meeting the IPCP standards. In 2005, nearly one-third (31%) 
of the CWHWS production was No. 3 wheat and thus unsuitable for the IPCP. Table 4.9 
illustrates the distribution of CWHWS production in the three Prairie Provinces. Production 
decreased between 2006 and 2008 by 82%, most significantly in Saskatchewan (an 89% decrease 
in acres) compared to Alberta and Manitoba (76% and 77% decrease in acres, respectively). In 
2008, Manitoba produced almost half of all CWHWS in Canada (44.2% of CWHWS 
production), with Saskatchewan and Alberta producing the remainder (27.3% and 28.5% 
respectively).  
Table 4.9: CWHWS Production and Contracted Acres in Western Canada 
  CWHWS Production (Acres)
i
 CWHWS Contracts
ii
 
Year Alberta Manitoba Saskatchewan Total (Acres) 
2008 41,070 63,700 39,375 144,145 150,000  
2007 45,480 84,100 105,912 235,492 210,000  
2006 171,990 277,950 372,070 822,010 565,000  
i
 Source: Authors calculation utilizing Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 001-0017 and CWB Variety      
               Survey 2006, 2007, 2008. 
ii 
Source: Rosher 2009. 
 
The value of the CWHWS program is relative to the amount of grain moved through the 
IPCP. Over the seven-year period after its introduction, the CWHWS IPCP has issued 3.17 
million acres worth of contracts. The CWHWS program offered a premium of $7.50/tonne for the 
first two years of operation, later reduced to $2.50/tonne in 2005 and has since remained 
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unchanged (CWB 2003, 2004, 2005c, 2006a, 2008a). From the number of reported CWB IPCP 
contracts for Snowbird it is estimated that the program has paid out $12.9 million to farmers in 
the form of premiums (Table 4.10).
23
 
Table 4.10: CWHWS Snowbird Contracted Acres and Premium per Tonne in Western 
Canada 
 Contracts Premium 
Year Total Acres $/ tonne Total ($) 
2009 160,000  2.50  400,000  
2008 150,000  2.50  375,000  
2007 210,000  2.50  525,000  
2006 565,000  2.50  1,412,500  
2005 1,095,000  2.50  2,737,500  
2004 745,000  7.50  5,587,500  
2003 245,000  7.50  1,837,500  
Total 3,170,000    12,875,000  
Source: Rosher 2009 
 
The CWHWS class consists of only IPCP varieties, preventing a comparison between 
CWHWS varieties that are inside and outside of the IPCP. A comparable class is Canadian 
Western Red Spring, which is similar to CWHWS in terms of having virtually identical 
production requirements (Ransom et al. 2006). Canadian Wheat Board pricing of CWRS and 
CWHWS are as two distinct classes, but prices for the same grade and protein content are 
identical in almost every period. The identical production requirements allow for the assumption 
that production costs are similar. Thus with identical costs and prices the two classes can be 
compared as equivalents. 
Seed prices for many CWRS varieties were unavailable during the period of 2006-09; this 
required the creation of a standardized CWRS variety for comparison purposes. The production 
characteristics (relative yield and relative protein) of the standardized CWRS variety are a 
weighted average of CWRS varieties according to their proportion of seeded acres in 
                                                 
23
 This is based on the assumption that one acre of land produces one tonne of grain. 
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Saskatchewan for the 2006-07, 2007-08, and 2008-09 crop years. The price of seed for the 
standardized CWRS variety was taken from the average seed cost according to the Crop Planning 
Guide published by SAFRR (2006a, 2007a, 2008a). The pricing of Snowbird is typically 
$4.00/bu more than the average seed cost of CWRS varieties (Alderson 2009). Seeding rate was 
assumed to be 1.5 bu/acre for both the standardized CWRS variety and Snowbird (SAFRR 
2006a, 2007a, and 2008a). Table 4.11 outlines the cost of seeding Snowbird and the standardized 
CWRS variety. 
Table 4.11: Seed Costs of Snowbird and the Standardized CWRS Variety 
  2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
  Snowbird CWRS Snowbird CWRS Snowbird CWRS 
Seed Price ($/bu) 12.97 8.97 14.05 10.05 16.68 12.68 
Seeding Rate (bu/acre) 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Seed Cost ($/acre) 19.46 13.46 21.08 15.08 25.02 19.02 
Source: SAFRR 2006a, 2007a, 2008a 
             Patterson Grain 2009 
 
The price of wheat is a function of grain grade, protein content, and world demand. Grade 
is dependent upon production practices and condition of grain at time of delivery. Protein content 
is a function of growing conditions, condition of grain at time of delivery and genetic potential. 
With the assumption of identical production practices and growing conditions, the only variation 
in price would be due to the genetic potential. The relative protein level was obtained from the 
Saskatchewan Varieties of Grain Crops Guide (SAFRR 2006b), and was assumed to remain 
constant for the duration of the study. Prices for CWRS and CWHWS were identical over the 
period of 2003 to 2008, allowing for direct comparison between the two classes. The grade of the 
grain is assumed to be No. 1 CWRS and No. 1 CWHWS. Prices were obtained from the final 
wheat board payments for No. 1 CWRS and No. 1 CWHWS for 2006 to 2008 at the relative 
protein content for the varieties. The relative protein content for Snowbird was reported as 14.2 
and the standardized CWRS varieties was calculated to be 14.2 in 2007 and 2008, and 14.1 in 
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2006. In addition to the price of grain, a delivery premium of $2.50/tonne was offered for 
Snowbird through the IPCP (CWB 2005c, 2006a, and 2008a). The cost of segregation was also 
included as an additional cost incurred by farmers participating in the IPCP; equal to $0.03/bu. 
Table 4.12 outlines the relative prices for Snowbird and the standardized CWRS variety. 
Table 4.12: Price of Grain, Segregation Cost and Net Price for Snowbird and the 
Standardized CWRS Variety 
  2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
  Snowbird CWRS Snowbird CWRS Snowbird CWRS 
Protein Content (%)
i
 14.2 14.1 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 
Price of Grain ($/bu)
ii
 5.88 5.87 10.21 10.21 7.48 7.48 
Premium ($/bu)
iii
 0.07 0 0.07 0 0.07  0 
Gross Price ($/bu) 5.95 5.87 10.28 10.21 7.48 7.48 
Segregation Cost ($/bu)
iv
 0.03 0 0.03 0 0.03 0 
Net Price ($/bu) 5.92 5.87 10.25 10.21 7.52 7.48 
i
  Source: SAFRR Varieties of Grain Crops 2006, 2007, 2008 
ii
 Source: Price of No. 1 CWRS. CWB Final Payments 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 
iii
 $2.50/tonne delivery premium converted at 36.74 bu/tonne 
iv
 $1.02/tonne segregation cost converted at 36.74 bu/tonne 
 
Crop production was examined in the three Saskatchewan soil zones: Brown, Dark Brown 
and Black. Crop yields were obtained from SAFRR for spring wheat in the three soil zones for 
the period of 2006 to 2008 (SAFRR 2006a, 2007a, 2008a). Expected yields of varieties were 
obtained from the Saskatchewan Variety of Grain Crops (2006b) and assumed to remain constant 
over the duration of this study. The expected yield for Snowbird compared to the standardized 
CWRS variety was reported to be 99% for the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones, and 102% for 
the Black soil zone. The weighted average yield adjustment for CWRS was calculated on a year 
by year basis for the three soil zones, resulting in a variation in relative yield for all three 
production years (Table 4.13). 
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Table 4.13: Estimated Yield of Snowbird and Standardized CWRS Variety 
  2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
  Snowbird CWRS
i
 Snowbird CWRS
i
 Snowbird CWRS
i
 
Brown Soil Zone Yield (bu/acre) 24.7 24.7 26.0 26.0 26.9 26.9 
 Relative Yield (%)  99 99.7 99 100.3 99 100.5 
 Estimated Yield (bu/acre) 24.5 24.6 25.7 26.1 26.6 27.0 
Dark Brown Soil Zone Yield (bu/acre) 36.4 36.4 30.7 30.7 31.7 31.7 
 Relative Yield (%)  99 99.7 99 100.3 99 100.5 
 Estimated Yield (bu/acre) 36.0 36.3 30.4 30.8 31.4 31.9 
Black Soil Zone Yield (bu/acre) 36.0 36.0 36.4 36.4 37.5 37.5 
 Relative Yield (%)  102 99.68 102 99.4 102 99.5 
 Estimated Yield (bu/acre) 36.7 35.9 37.1 36.2 38.3 37.3 
i
 The standardized CWRS variety % yield is the weighted average for CWRS varieties 
Source: SAFRR 2006a, 2007a, 2008a 
 
The overall benefit to farmers from the Snowbird IPCP is dependent on the yield and 
protein content of the grain, which in turn is influenced by the soil type and environmental 
conditions during the growing season. Table 4.14 outlines the distribution of CWHWS acres 
across the four Saskatchewan crop production zones. Production of CWHWS in Saskatchewan 
has dominantly been in the Brown soil zone, accounting for 73.5% of the production in 2008, and 
46.8% of the production in 2007. Estimated seeded acres of CWHWS in Saskatchewan in 2008 
was 39,790 acres (0.3% of acres seeded to wheat in Saskatchewan) which is a decrease by 63% 
from 2007 when 107,083 acres were seeded (0.9% of acres seeded to wheat in Saskatchewan). 
The decrease in CWHWS production occurred across all soil zones except in the Grey soil zone; 
where production remained relatively stable (4,134 acres in 2008 and 4,073 acres in 2007). Crop 
districts were aligned with soil zones according to Figure 4.1 for the estimation of the distribution 
of CWHWS production. 
 
 
 101 
 
Table 4.14: Distribution of CWHWS Snowbird Production (% and Acres) in Saskatchewan 
 2007 2008 
Soil Zone % Production Acres % Production Acres 
Brown 46.8 50,165  73.5 29,216 
Dark Brown 32.2 34,515  15.8 6,281 
Black 17.1 18,329  0.4 159 
Grey 3.8 4,073  10.4 4,134 
Total 100 107,083  100 39,790 
Source: Authors calculation utilizing CWB Saskatchewan Variety Survey 2007, 2008 
             SAFRR: Saskatchewan Crop District Crop Production 2007, 2008 
 
The revenue less seed cost (RLSC) of Snowbird over the standardized CWRS variety 
demonstrates the per acre advantage or disadvantage of involvement in the Snowbird IPCP to an 
average farmer in each of the three soil zones (Table 4.1). Yield played an important role in 
determining the relative profitability of Snowbird. The lower grain yield of Snowbird compared 
to the standardized CWRS variety in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones plus the higher initial 
cost in seed (relative profitability on average of -2.8% and -3.3% respectively, Table 4.15) was 
greater than the market premiums returned to farmers. The Black soil zone appeared to provide 
yields that compensated for the increase in seed price, providing an average benefit over the three 
years of 0.6% above the standardized CWRS variety. With these results an average farmer in the 
Brown and Dark Brown soil zones would not be able to benefit from participation in the 
Snowbird IPCP as the premium offered by the CWB was insufficient to overcome the costs of 
involvement in the program (seed price and segregation cost). 
The measurement of the total benefit of participating in the IPCP is relative to the 
opportunity cost of engaging in another activity, growing a CWRS variety. With the difference in 
RLSC being the measure of opportunity cost of involvement in the IPCP, the total opportunity 
cost for representative Saskatchewan farmers involved in the IPCP in 2006, 2007 and 2008 is 
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outlined in Table 4.16. Grey soil zone production was grouped with the Black soil zone as 
production data was unavailable. Since Snowbird production in 2006 is unknown it was assumed 
to be the same as that in 2007. The difference in RLSC was weighted across the soil zones based 
on percentage of CWHWS acres, providing a weighted average difference in RLSC.  
Table 4.15: Calculated Revenue and Benefit of Producing Snowbird CWHWS Compared to 
a Standardized CWRS variety in Saskatchewan 
  2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
 Snowbird CWRS
iii
 Snowbird CWRS
iii
 Snowbird CWRS
iii
 
Brown Soil Zone       
 Net Price  5.95 5.87 10.25 10.21 7.52 7.48 
 Yield 24.5 24.6 25.7 26.1 26.6 27 
 Revenue 145.04 143.82 266.5 265.46 202.288 201.212 
 Seed Cost 19.46 13.46 21.08 15.08 25.02 19.02 
 RLSC ($/acre)
i
 125.58 130.36 245.42 250.38 177.27 182.19 
 Difference in RLSC ($/acre)
 ii 
 -4.78  -4.96  -4.92  
 Difference in RLSC (%) -3.7%  -2%  -2.7%  
Dark Brown Soil Zone       
 Net Price  5.95 5.87 10.25 10.21 7.52 7.48 
 Yield 36 36.3 30.4 30.8 31.4 31.9 
 Revenue 213.12 213.08 311.60 314.47 236.13 238.61 
 Seed Cost 19.46 13.46 21.08 15.08 25.02 19.02 
 RLSC ($/acre)
 i
 193.66 199.60 290.52 299.39 211.11 219.59 
 Difference in RLSC ($/acre)
 ii
 -5.94  -8.87  -8.48  
 Difference in RLSC (%) -3%  -3%  -3.9%  
Black Soil Zone       
 Net Price  5.95 5.87 10.25 10.21 7.52 7.48 
 Yield 36.7 35.9 37.1 36.2 38.3 37.3 
 Revenue 217.26 210.73 280.28 369.60 288.02 279.00 
 Seed Cost 19.46 13.46 21.08 15.08 25.02 19.02 
 RLSC ($/acre)
 i
 197.80 197.25 359.20 354.52 263.00 259.98 
 Difference in RLSC ($/acre)
 ii
 0.55  4.67  3.01  
 Difference in RLSC (%) 0.3%  1%  1.2%  
i
 Revenue less seed cost (RLSC) 
ii
 Difference in RLSC is the RLSC of Snowbird less the RLSC of the standardized CWRS variety. 
iii
 Standardized Canadian Western Red Spring Wheat variety is a weighted average for all CWRS 
varieties. 
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Table 4.16: Estimated Farmer Benefit of CWHWS Production Compared to a 
Standardized CWRS Variety in Saskatchewan 
 2006 2007 2008 Total 
Brown Soil Zone     
Difference in RLSC ($/acre) -4.78 -4.96 -4.92  
Percent of CWHWS Acres 46.8 46.8 73.5  
Weighted Difference -2.24 -2.32 -3.62  
Dark Brown Soil Zone     
Difference in RLSC ($/acre) -5.94 -8.87 -8.48  
Percent of CWHWS Acres 32.2 32.2 15.8  
Weighted Difference -1.91 -2.86 -1.34  
Black Soil Zone
i
     
Difference in RLSC ($/acre) 0.55 4.67 3.01  
Percent of CWHWS Acres 20.9 20.9 10.8  
Weighted Difference 0.11 0.98 0.33  
Average Weighted Benefit ($/acre) -4.04 -4.20 -4.63  
Estimated Contracted Acres 372,070 105,912 39,375 517,357 
Relative Profitability -1,503,163 -444,830 -182,306 -2,130,299 
i
 The Black soil zone includes production in the Grey soil zone 
ii
 Difference in revenue less seed cost (RLSC) is the difference between the RLSC of Snowbird less the 
RLSC of the standardized CWRS variety 
 
The estimated opportunity cost of involvement in the CWHWS IPCP for a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer is overwhelmingly negative. The price premium of Snowbird certified seed, 
which was $4.00/bu over other CWRS varieties, more than compensates for both the premium 
offered by the CWB and the yield and protein advantages of Snowbird. The estimated average 
weighted benefit for producing Snowbird decreased in absolute value over the three year period 
from -$4.04/acre in 2006 to -$4.63/acre in 2008. The decrease in absolute value was a result of 
acreage shifting to the Brown soil zone, from the Dark Brown and Black soil zones. Yield 
appeared to be the determining factor where snowbird was marginally lower than CRS yield. A 
yield improvement of 3-4% for Snowbird would result in producers being indifferent between 
producing the Snowbird IPCP and the standardized CWRS variety. The estimated total 
accumulated opportunity cost for representative Saskatchewan farmers involved in the Snowbird 
IPCP from 2006 to 2008 is around $2.13 million (an accumulated opportunity cost of 2.05%). It 
is important to note that this opportunity cost is not what was actually experienced by 
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Saskatchewan farmers, but a projection of the profitability of involvement in the CWHWS IPCP 
by a representative Saskatchewan farmer.  
4.3 Limitations of the Empirical Model 
The empirical analysis required the use of weak data and many assumptions in order to 
provide insight into the exertion of market power by the seed industry. The data used in the study 
was limited by only providing a snapshot of seed prices at a few locations, which may not 
provide an accurate representation of actual average certified seed prices. Stronger panel data 
would have provided seed prices that was more directly comparable. The comparison of 
profitability required the alignment of crop production zones to soil zones, resulting in 
inaccuracies in acreage assigned to soil zones and the total benefit (opportunity cost) of farmer 
participation in the IPCP. As well, the production of AC Navigator was both within and outside 
of the IPCP preventing an accurate estimation of where production occurred. 
4.4 Summary 
The objective of this chapter was to compare the relative profitability of Snowbird and 
AC Navigator to non-IPCP varieties. The basis of comparison was on the assumption of a 
representative Saskatchewan farmer would participate in the IPCP in each of the three soil zones. 
In both cases, the initial cost of seed for AC Navigator and Snowbird exceeded the IPCP 
premiums and agronomic trait advantage of the varieties with respect to non-IPCP varieties. As 
such, farmer participation in the IPCP must be either by farmers with above average ability to 
produce the grain, or compensated by other benefits made available through the IPCP. Chapter 
five will delve into the policy implications of the price premium on rent distribution of the IPCP. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5 Results, Discussion and Conclusion 
With the development of the Identity Preserved Contract Program (IPCP) the Canadian 
Wheat Board (CWB) was able to create an identity preservation (IP) system for Canadian wheat. 
The IPCP creates an opportunity for farmers to increase their revenue through diversification and 
an opportunity to produce a product that commands a premium from the market. Marketing 
programs such as the IPCP are vulnerable to the exertion of market power by critical agricultural 
input suppliers extracting the majority of the rents. The objective of this study was to model and 
examine the distribution of rents within the IPCP where input suppliers possess significant 
market power. The hypothesis was that seed companies are exerting market power within the 
IPCP and extracting the majority of the rents. When examining the IPCP the majority of the 
results indicated that, a farmer getting average yields and selling the grain at an average price 
would likely not receive sufficient compensation in the form of a premium to cover the increased 
seed costs (see chapter four). As well, the presence of a production constraint increases the ability 
of a seed company with market power to extract premiums provided to farmers participating in 
the IPCP (see chapter three). Overall, the combination of policies and market power of the seed 
industry resulted in the IPCP having limited profitability for representative Saskatchewan farmers 
as the seed industry captures the premium offered to farmers by the IPCP. The results of the 
theoretical and empirical model prevent the rejection of the hypothesis of this thesis. This 
indicated that the seed companies are extracting the majority of the rents, leaving little of the 
premium for the representative Saskatchewan farmer. 
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This section continues to discuss the results of the theoretical and empirical analysis, 
drawing conclusions from the results. Followed by an examination of the limitations of this 
study, as well as providing suggestions for further research. 
5.1 Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model examined the impact of constrained production and market 
development activities on rent distribution between farmers and the seed industry under a variety 
of different seed ownership structures. Two scenarios of the theoretical model represent the 
IPCP; scenario two with the policy of constraining production, and scenario four with the policies 
of constrained production and market development activities. The purpose of the theoretical 
model was to determine the presence of incentives for the marketer to engage in market 
development activities with the goal of increasing farmer welfare.  
The base case and scenario three (market development activities in the absence of a 
production constraint) illustrate the impact of market power on consumer and farmer welfare. In 
the base case total economic surplus is maximized in the absence of market power by the seed 
industry (the perfectly competitive case), and minimized in the presence of a monopoly. Exertion 
of market power by the seed industry results in a restricted supply of seed, which results in the 
transfer of consumer and producer surplus of IP grain to the seed company. In scenario three, the 
introduction of market development activities demonstrates that a monopolistic seed ownership 
structure results in the seed industry capturing half of the premium generated by the market 
development activities, with the rest of the premium distributed between consumers and farmers 
dependent on their relative slope coefficients.  
The introduction of the production constraint amplified the ability of the seed industry to 
extract rents from the market. In the case of a seed industry that has a monopolistic or a 
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concentrated oligopolistic ownership of varieties (where δ > λ), farmer and consumer welfare 
were seen to increase as a result of the constrained production quantity being greater than the 
unconstrained quantity. In cases where market power of the seed industry was low, perfectly 
competitive or competitive oligopoly seed industry (where market power was below equation 
(3.51), farmer producer surplus was shown to decrease but provided a greater opportunity for 
participating farmers to extract rents from the system. Consumers obtained the least benefit from 
this policy, showing a redistribution of consumer surplus to farmers and seed industry when 
faced with a perfectly competitive or competitive oligopoly seed ownership structures. 
Introduction of the production constraint results in sub-optimal profits for the seed industry, 
reducing the rents the seed company could extract. Farmer welfare was shown to increase as a 
result of the implementation of the production constraint in the presence of market power being 
exerted by the seed industry. However, farmer welfare decreased in the absence in market power 
exerted by the seed industry. From a policy perspective, the implementation of the production 
constraint succeeded in increasing farmer welfare (producer surplus of IP grain) in the presence 
of a seed industry exerting market power. 
The introduction of market development activities with constrained production resulted in 
a variety of welfare effects. With the assumption that consumers are price takers, the price 
premium generated by the market development activities is divided between the seed company 
and farmers, relative to their degree of market power. Oligopoly or monopolistic seed ownership 
structures resulted in the majority of the price premium being captured by the seed industry, as 
illustrated in equation (3.76). The production constraint allows for the market development 
activities to have a greater impact on farmer welfare when presented with a competitive oligopoly 
or perfectly competitive seed ownership structure. In a case where there is an oligopolistic seed 
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ownership structure the introduction of the market development activities increases the ability of 
farmers to benefit from participating in the IPCP, comparing equation (3.90) to equation (3.45). 
From a policy perspective the implementation of market development activities on a constrained 
production will have limited success as farmer welfare may not increase where the seed industry 
is exerting market power and extracting the majority of the premium. In conclusion farmers in an 
IPPM system that is faced by a seed industry with a high degree of market power will receive 
little benefit from market development activities that improve the market premium.  
The uneven distribution of rents within an IPPM system can be addressed through two 
methods; cost sharing and vertical integration. Cost sharing between the marketer and seed 
industry allows the correlation between the distribution of cost for market development activities 
and the distribution of benefits from the elicited premium. Vertical integration provides 
ownership over the marketing activities by the seed company, or variety ownership by the 
marketer. Seed industry vertical integration results in the formation of a private IPPM system 
where the seed industry forms production contracts with farmers and markets the product. This 
situation would result in the monopoly solution as seen in scenario two and four, where the seed 
industry captures the entire benefit of market development activities as well as covers the cost of 
the IPPM system and costs of market development activities. Vertical integration by the marketer 
proposed in this study would result in the perfectly competitive solution for scenario two and 
four, where farmers would be able capture the majority of the benefit from market development 
activities, less the additional costs of licensing and seed multiplication.  
Development of IPPM systems in the presence of a high degree of market power 
possessed by the seed industry significantly influences rent distribution between participants as 
well as providing disincentives for market development activities. Addressing the discrepancies 
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between distribution of market development costs and the extraction of rents results in the 
removal of the disincentives and increases the profitability for all participants in the IPPM 
system. 
5.2 Empirical Analysis 
The two case studies of the empirical analysis (AC Navigator and Snowbird) provided 
evidence of the exertion of market power by the seed industry. The varieties examined represent 
scenario four of the theoretical model of having constrained production with market development 
activities. The case of AC Navigator examined the difference in industry structure on seed 
pricing, providing insight into the pricing decision between two comparable varieties with the 
same ownership structure, as well as between a monopolistic and oligopolistic ownership 
structure. The Snowbird case compared the IPCP variety to a non-IPCP variety over a three-year 
period to examine the impact of changes in grain prices and yield on the relative profitability of 
involvement in the IPCP. 
5.2.1 AC Navigator 
This study examined 2006 survey price data for AC Navigator, AC Avonlea, and Kyle. 
The three varieties demonstrated the three different marketing structures; a monopoly IPCP 
variety (AV Navigator), a monopoly non-IPCP variety (AC Avonlea), and a competitive 
oligopoly variety (Kyle). The comparison of AC Navigator to AC Avonlea, and to Kyle, 
demonstrated the pricing behaviour of the seed industry. The comparison between AC Navigator 
and AC Avonlea follows the model of a monopolistic seed industry, as Viterra owns both 
varieties, allowing for a comparison between similar varieties that are under a similar pricing 
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structure. The variety Kyle is under an oligopolistic ownership structure allowing for its 
comparison with AC Navigator to show the impact of a monopolistic ownership on seed price.  
The comparison between AC Navigator and AC Avonlea allows for the examination of 
the influence of the IPCP on variety pricing. With both varieties owned by Viterra, a similar 
pricing formula of varieties can be assumed. AC Navigator‟s lower protein level and increased 
cost of seeding resulted in a decrease in profitability found to be greater than the delivery and 
production premiums offered by the IPCP. The opportunity costs of a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer involved in the AC Navigator IPCP, instead of growing AC Avonlea, was 
found to be $2.14/acre or 1% of revenue less seed cost (RLSC) (from Table 4.6). Based on the 
opportunity costs, AC Navigator seed can be reasonably assumed to be overpriced by $1.43/bu. 
From these results, the seed industry is shown to be exerting market power, resulting in a price of 
certified seed that is greater than the premiums offered by the AC Navigator IPCP where a farmer 
receiving average yields and prices. As a result, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in this 
case.  
The comparison between AC Navigator and Kyle illustrates the influence of different 
seed ownership structures on profitability of involvement in the IPCP vs. that of a conventional 
well-established variety. In 2006, a representative Saskatchewan farmer participating in the AC 
Navigator IPCP would have received $10.63/acre more than what they would have received if 
they had purchased and planted Kyle. This provided a measurement of the total rents that were 
made available to farmers as a result of participating in the AC Navigator IPCP, where 
cumulative involvement by representative Saskatchewan farmers would have resulted in a benefit 
of $2.75 million. These results fall in line with reports by farmers being able to achieve a benefit 
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of $14/acre from involvement with the AC Navigator IPCP (CWB 2005a). This case results in 
the rejection of the hypothesis as farmers extract rents from the system. 
The AC Navigator case illustrates the impact of a release of the variety outside of the 
IPCP. Viterra controls all AC Navigator production, where production outside of the IPCP is 
under a different production contracts. A wider release allows for varieties that are agronomically 
competitive to have a higher value to the seed company by being able to compete for a greater 
market share. The comparison between AC Navigator and Kyle, where a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer is able to obtain $10.63/acre more revenue illustrates either that the 
presence of a non-limited release of AC Navigator resulted in a lower price, or that the certified 
seed price of Kyle is underpriced, or that some variable was not included in the variety valuation. 
Comparison between AC Navigator and other contemporary durum varieties (AC 
Avonlea) demonstrates price premium offered by the IPCP does not compensate for the higher 
price of seed. In cases where AC Navigator is compared to older varieties (Kyle) its yield and 
quality improvements assist in overcoming the higher seed price, irrespective of the presence of 
the price premium. This creates a caveat for the null hypothesis posed by this study. The 
hypothesis cannot be rejected when compared to current varieties, but must be rejected when 
compared to older established varieties. 
5.2.2 Snowbird 
The study examined the relative profitability of Snowbird over a period of 3 years, 
measuring the impact of its production characteristics relative to a standardized Canadian 
Western Red Spring (CWRS) variety. Three variables influenced relative profitability: standard 
protein content, relative yield, and relative seed prices. Over the three-year period, the higher 
price of seed resulted in lower profitability for farmers participating in the CWHWS IPCP who 
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receive average yields and average prices. The results showed that the price of Snowbird seed to 
be overpriced by $2.74/bu. The overpricing of seed resulted in a 3% lower profitability to a 
representative Saskatchewan farmer from participating in the Snowbird IPCP when compared to 
the standardized CWRS variety. 
Yield improvements were closely tied to profitability, as indicated by the different soil 
zones. Yields in the Black soil repeatedly showed to be able to compensate for the higher cost of 
seeding through greater yields than that of the Brown or Dark Brown soil zones. With production 
of CWHWS primarily found in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones, the areas reported with 
the lowest average yield, geographic participation in the IPCP is centered around specific 
Patterson Grain delivery points and not the areas where production would be the most profitable. 
The persistence of the CWHWS IPCP in the Brown and Dark Brown soil zones demonstrates that 
there is some benefit conveyed to farmers beyond relative yield, relative protein and the IPCP 
premium.  
The relative decrease in profitability to an average farmer from involvement in the 
Snowbird IPCP in 2006 was underestimated because actual reported production of CWHWS was 
30% greater than that contracted by the CWB, resulting from low quality grain. Insufficient data 
of the distribution of substandard IPCP Snowbird grain prevents an accurate estimation due to the 
associated loss. The total estimated cost of a farmer being unable to sell CWHWS in the IPCP is 
equal to the increase in seeding cost of $6.00/acre and the loss of the $2.50/tonne contract 
premium, resulting in an estimated additional loss of $8.50/acre, excluding the expected 
differences in price between No. 3 wheat and No. 1 or No. 2 .
24
 
                                                 
24
 Assuming 1 acre of land produces 1 tonne of grain. 
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The difference in profitability for the involvement in the Snowbird CWHWS IPCP 
compared to standardized CWRS variety was consistently negative for all three years. The 
average difference in profitability, including the delivery premium, ranged between $-3.83 to $-
6.08/acre. The consistent relative decrease in profitability for the involvement of a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer in the Snowbird CWHWS IPCP does not allow for the hypothesis set out 
by this study to be rejected.  
5.3 Conclusions and Implications of the Study 
The CWB achieved its goals for the IPCP by creating an IP program for Western 
Canadian farmers, but showed limited ability to prevent rents intended for farmers extracted by 
upstream participants. The empirical analysis showed that for both Snowbird, a CWHWS variety, 
and AC Navigator, a CWAD variety, that the seed companies were charging a premium for 
certified capturing most of the rents. Thus, there is limited profitability for a representative 
Saskatchewan farmer to be involved in these two programs, where the direct benefit of 
involvement is close to zero. Attribution to the increase in cost of certified seed for IPCP 
varieties can be made to the production contract, the CWB IPCP premium, limited release of the 
IPCP varieties, and other benefits from involvement in the IPCP. As a result, the price of certified 
seed for IPCP varieties is linked to the IPCP premium, and its removal/absence should result in 
little impact on farmer welfare, providing the absence of the premium would result in an 
equivalent decrease in price of certified seed. 
The theoretical model illustrated what was occurring in the empirical model. Both IPCP 
varieties were represented by scenario four; production constraint with market development 
activities. Seed company market power arises from the ownership/licensing of varieties, allowing 
the seed company to extract the IPCP premium from farmers. The introduction of the IPCP 
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premium resulted in little or no increase in farmer welfare, as seed companies extracted the 
premium. Market development activities primarily benefit the owners (licensers) of the seed 
varieties, creating little incentive for the CWB to conduct market development activities in the 
name of increased farmer returns. The results of the empirical analysis concurred demonstrating 
that seed companies were potentially extracting $12.9 million worth of premium from the 
CWHWS IPCP, and $8.8 million worth of premium from the AC Navigator IPCP. 
A major constraint for farmer profitability lies within the production contracts requiring 
farmers to utilize certified seed and to sell all of the grain produced to the seed company. 
Removal of these clauses would allow farmers to keep and utilize saved seed for future year‟s 
production, allowing the cost of certified seed to be amortized over a number of years. The 
removal of the clauses increases the value of certified seed to farmers, allowing for a higher 
generation of revenue off a single purchase of certified seed. The increase in value to farmers 
would be expected to result in an even higher cost of certified seed, allowing the seed industry to 
capture some of the benefit of saved seed. The increase in certified seed cost from the removal of 
the clauses would still be limited from the deterrence of farmers entering in the IPCP, lessening 
farmer participation and the market for the varieties seed. An alternate solution is to address the 
ownership issue of IPCP seed varieties. If a public institution (or benevolent third party) 
maintained ownership, seed industry market power would abate, allow the IPCP premium to be 
captured by farmers. 
Identity preserved production and marketing systems require a balance of obligations and 
incentives to operate properly. The absence of the premium offered to farmers by the CWB, 
could cause an impact in other sectors involved in the IPCP, by decreasing the amount of rents 
available for upstream participants to extract. As previously discussed, an absence of sufficient 
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incentives could result in failure of the IPCP. The extraction of the farmer premium by the seed 
industry may satisfy the seed companies rent distribution requirement, compensating other supply 
chain activities that they are involved in, or to compensate for the limited release for the variety. 
As such, the farmer premium may play an important role satisfying seed company compliance 
and participation, but fails to improve the profitability for a representative Saskatchewan farmer 
participating in the IPCP. 
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
The study limited ultimately by the availability of seed price data, and distributional data 
for farmer involvement in the IPCP. Improved data would allow for a better estimation of the 
total transfer of rents from the CWB to farmers and from farmers to seed companies. The study is 
also limited in its scope by only examining two IPCP varieties, as well as having poor 
benchmarks for comparison. Additionally, the farmer examined in this study is assumed to have 
average yields and prices, which may not be reflective of the farmers that self selected to 
participate in the IPCP. Because of these limitations, an accurate estimation cannot be made of 
the exertion of market power by seed companies on farmers participating in the IPCP.  
5.5 Suggestions for Further Study 
This study provides groundwork for further study into the exertion of market power by 
the seed industry on farmers involved in IPPM systems. The policies of an IPPM system provide 
the framework for its operation, as well as providing incentives for participation by all members 
of the agricultural supply chain. The inclusion or removal of a single policy can have drastic 
effects on the distribution of rents within the system possibly resulting in a system failing to meet 
its goals by providing insufficient incentives to one sector of the supply chain. 
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The benefit to farmers involved in the CWB‟s IPCP go beyond that of the per tonne 
premium offered. Farmers are presented with other opportunities to increase or stabilize their 
revenue, such as escalating on-farm storage premiums and the guaranteed acceptance. Taking 
into account these other factors, the benefit to farmers from involvement in the IPCP could be 
greater than that estimated in this study. As a result, the measurements conducted to detect the 
exertion of market power by seed industries may weaken the results, demonstrating that the seed 
company may not extract all of the rents but only the majority of the rents. 
Further research can examine the impact of removal or inclusion of policies into an IPPM 
system similar to the IPCP. The farmer premium can influence seed industries willingness to 
participate in an IPPM system. This incentive increases in importance when the variety being 
included can compete agronomically with conventional varieties. As well, the inclusion of the 
premium may provide compensation for other activities the seed company engages in, resulting 
from their vertically integrated into the agricultural supply chain.  
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7 Appendix A: Canadian Grain Grading System 
The Canadian grain grading system segregates grain into different groups by meeting 
certain standards. Canadian wheat is grouped into seven classes each consisting of five different 
grades No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No.4 and feed, and then within the grades by protein content 
(measured at the 13.5% moisture content), excluding feed wheat. The grain grading system‟s 
purpose is to facilitate transactions by balancing customer expectations and returns to producers, 
as well as preserving the quality of individual parcels of grain (Canadian Grain Commission, 
2009b). 
The grading of grain is determined along five characteristics: test weight, varietal purity, 
soundness, vitreousness, and presence of foreign material (not including dockage). Each grade of 
grain is dependent on the minimum standards for the grain, creating a range of quality attributes 
within grades. The characteristics are measured either visually or mechanically. All 
characteristics are measured after dockage is removed as defined by the cleaning procedures for 
each class of grain. The test weight is a measure of the un-compacted grain measured in kg/hl. 
Varietal purity measures the presence of grain of contrasting classes and wheats of other classes. 
Contrasting classes are classes that have a different colour of wheat, while wheats of other classes 
or varieties can be of other classes that can blend. Soundness pertains to maturation of the grain 
and the condition of the grain in terms of damage (broken or shrunken seed, as well as disease). 
Vitreousness is the translucent appearance of the grain associated with high protein and hard 
kernels, and influenced by the class of wheat and the growing conditions. 
Table 7.1 provides an example of the Canadian grain grading system for Canadian 
Western Hard White Spring wheat. 
  
Table 7.1: Grain Grading for CWHWS 
 Standard of quality Foreign material 
Grade name 
Minimum test 
weight kg/hl 
(g/0.5L) 
Variety 
Minimu
m protein 
% 
Degree of soundness Ergot % 
Excreta 
% 
Matter other 
than cereal 
grains % 
Sclerotinia 
% 
Stones % 
Total 
% 
No.1 CWHWS 75 (365) Any variety of the class 
CWHWS designated as such 
by order of the Commission 
10 Reasonably well matured, 
reasonably free from damaged 
kernels 
0.01 0.01 0.2 0.01 0.03 0.6 
No. 2 CWHWS 75 (365) Any variety of the class 
CWHWS designated as such 
by order of the Commission 
No 
minimum 
Fairly well matured, may be 
moderately bleached or frost-
damaged, reasonably free 
from severely damaged 
kernels 
0.02 0.01 0.3 0.02 0.03 1.2 
No. 3 CWHWS 72 (350) Any variety of the class 
CWHWS designated as such 
by order of the Commission 
No 
minimum 
May be frost-damaged, 
immature or weather-
damaged, moderately free 
from severely damaged 
kernels 
0.04 0.015 0.5 0.04 0.06 2.4 
No. 4 CWHWS 68 (330) Any variety of the class 
CWHWS designated as such 
by order of the Commission 
No 
minimum 
May be severely frost-
damaged, immature or 
weather-damaged, moderately 
free from other severely 
damaged kernels 
0.04 0.015 0.5 0.04 0.06 2.4 
CW Feed 65 (315) Any class or variety of wheat 
excluding amber durum and 
General Purpose 
No 
minimum 
Reasonably sweet, excluded 
from other grades of wheat on 
account of damaged kernels 
0.1 0.03 1 0.1 0.1 10 
 
  
Wheats of other classes or 
varieties 
Artificial stain, 
no residue % 
Dark, 
Immature 
% 
Degerme
d % 
Fireburnt 
% 
Fusarium 
damage % 
Grass 
green % 
Grasshopper, 
army worm 
% 
Heated 
Grade name 
Contrasting 
classes % 
Total % 
Binburnt, severely 
mildewed, rotted, 
mouldy % 
Total 
% 
No.1 
CWHWS 
3 3 Nil 1 4 Nil 0.25 0.75 1 1 kernel per 1000 
g 
0.05 
No. 2 
CWHWS 
3 3 5K 2.5 7 Nil 1 2 3 4 kernels per 1000 
g 
0.4 
No. 3 
CWHWS 
5 5 10K 10 13 Nil 2 10 8 6 kernels per 1000 
g 
1 
No. 4 
CWHWS 
5 5 10K 10 13 Nil 2 10 8 6 kernels per 1000 
g 
1 
CW Feed No limit-but not more than 10% 
amber durum and/or General 
Purpose 
2 No limit No limit 2 5 No limit No limit 2.5 2.5 
Source; Canadian Grain Commission 2009b 
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2
4
 
